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JUDGMENTS BY DEFAULT-A SURVEY OF TEXAS LAW
by
Michael A. Pohl* and Stephen R. Kirklin**
A judgment is any final determination by a court of competent jurisdic-
tion of the rights of the parties on matters submitted to the court.' This
Article is concerned, however, only with the operation and legal effects of
two kinds of judgments: judgments by default and judgments nil dicit. An
examination of the mechanics of obtaining such judgments and the alterna-
tives available to a defendant desiring relief therefrom is the focus of this
survey.
I. JUDGMENTS By DEFAULT DEFINED
A judgment by default is one entered against a defendant who, having
been properly served, fails to timely answer.2 Its purpose is to keep dockets
current, thereby preventing a procrastinating defendant from impeding the
plaintiff in the establishment of his claim.3 It is not supposed to be a
procedural device to help the plaintiff obtain a judgment without experienc-
ing the difficulty that arises from a contest on the merits. 4
A judgment nil dicit serves much the same purpose as a judgment by
default. It is entered against a defendant who fails to interpose a defense on
the merits after the denial of a dilatory plea, neglects to oppose a cross-
action or counterclaim,5 or abandons or withdraws his answer.6 Since judg-
ments nil dicit and default judgment cases do not differ in any material
respect, 7 they are cited interchangeably throughout this Article.
II. COMMENCEMENT OF THE ACTION
Although a civil suit in district or county court is commenced by filing a
petition in the office of the clerk,8 the petition must meet certain requisites in
* B.A., East Texas State University; J.D., University of Houston. Attorney at Law,
Houston, Texas.
** B.S., University of Houston; J.D., University of Houston. Attorney at Law, Houston,
Texas.
I. Traveler's Ins. Co. v. United States, 283 F. Supp. 14, 28 & n.25 (S.D. Tex. 1968); Fort
Worth Acid Works v. City of Fort Worth, 248 S.W. 822, 824 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1922), aff'd, 259 S.W. 919 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1924, jdgmt adopted).
2. 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 187, at 324 (1947); see TEX. R. Civ. P. 239.
3. 47 Am. JUR. 2D Judgments § 1152, at 184 (1969).
4. Beck v. Avondino, 50 S.W. 207, 209 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, no writ); 47 AM. JUR. 2D
Judgments § 1152, at 184 (1969).
5. Frymire Eng'r Co. v. Grantham, 524 S.W.2d 680, 681 (Tex. 1975); 4 R. McDONALD,
TEXAS CIVIL PRACTICE § 17.25, at 126 (F. Elliott rev. ed. 1971).
6. Graves v. Cameron, 77 Tex. 273, 14 S.W. 59 (1890); Wheeler v. Pope, 5 Tex. 262, 264
(1849); 4 R. McDONALD, supra note 5, § 17.25, at 126.
7. 1 H. BLACK, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 79, at 108-09 (2d ed. 1902); 3 A.
FREEMAN, A TREATISE OF THE LAW OF JUDGMENTS § 1262, at 2628 (E. Tuttle rev. ed. 1925); 49
C.J.S. Judgments § 187, at 325 (1947); see Hatton v. Gonzalez, 541 S.W.2d 197, 198 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ); Bredeson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
513 S.W.2d 110, 112 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ).
8. TEX. R. CIV. P. 22.
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 31
order to invoke the court's subject matter jurisdiction.9 Under the Texas
Rules of Civil Procedure, a petition need only consist of a statement in plain
and concise language of the plaintiff's cause of action.' ° That an allegation
be evidentiary or conclusory is not grounds for objection when fair notice to
the opponent is given by the allegations as a whole."I Nor must a pleading be
technically correct so long as it does not affirmatively show that the plaintiff
has no cause of action.' 2 To support a default judgment a plaintiff need not
set out in his pleadings the evidence on which he relies to establish his cause
of action' 3 since the rules expressly approve more general allegations than
formerly were permitted. As a consequence, a default judgment will stand if
a claim upon which the substantive law would give relief is alleged with
sufficient particularity to give fair notice to the defendant of the basis for the
complaint, even though elements of the petition would require revision if
attacked by special exceptions.' 4
At the pleading stage the non-appearing defendant is governed by two
basic pleadings rules. First, a defendant, by his default, admits all material
transversible allegations of a petition except those pertaining to unliquidated
damage; 15 and second, rule 90,16 concerning waiver of defects in pleadings,
does not apply to a party against whom a default judgment is rendered. 17 As
a result, the courts have fashioned a variety of rules for testing the sufficien-
cy of pleadings depending in part on the nature of the claim asserted.
Despite the foregoing liberal pleading rules and the apparently severe conse-
quences of failing to interpose a defense on the merits, courts have often
found fatal pleading defects in a default judgment situation. For example, it
is clear that in a suit on a sworn account the mechanical requisites of rule
18518 must be strictly observed. 9 Other examples of pleading defects which
9. Edwards Feed Mill, Inc. v. Johnson, 158 Tex. 313, 317, 311 S.W.2d 232, 233-34 (1958).
The total absence of pleadings renders any judgment in the case void. The court derives its
power to act over the subject matter of the claim from the pleadings. Id. at 316, 311 S.W.2d at
233. Smith v. Pegram, 80 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1935, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Hart v. Hunter, 114 S.W. 882, 886 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, writ ref'd); see Howe v. Keystone Pipe
& Supply Co., 115 Tex. 158, 274 S.W. 563 (1925); Queen Ins. Co. v. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry.,
296 S.W. 484, 484-85 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted); Bray v. Bray, I S.W.2d 525
(Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1927, no writ). It is also error to enter a judgment where the clerk is
unable to locate the petition. Carborundum Co. v. Keese, 313 S.W.2d 332, 334-35 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1958, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see TEX. R. Civ. P. 77.
10. TEX. R. Civ, P. 45.
11. Stayton, The Scope and Function of Pleading Under the New Federal and Texas Rules,
Tex. R. Cii. P. Ann. 45, 20 TEXAS L. REV. 16 (1941).
12. Edwards Feed Mill, Inc. v. Johnson, 158 Tex. 313, 317, 311 S.W.2d 232, 234 (1958).
13. Id. at 317, 311 S.W.2d at 234-35; Hillson Steel Prods., Inc. v. Wirth Ltd., 538 S.W.2d
162, 163-64 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976, no writ).
14. 4 R. McDoNALD, supra note 5, § 17.23.3, at 120.
15. Williamsburg Nursing Home, Inc. v. Paramedics, Inc., 460 S.W.2d 168, 170 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1970, no writ); Southern S.S. Co. v. Schumacher Co., 154 S.W.2d
283, 284 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1941, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
16. TEX. R. Civ. P. 90.
17. See, e.g., Hancock v. O.K. Rental Equip. Co., 441 S.W.2d 955, 956 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1969, no writ); C & H Transp. Co. v. Wright, 396 S.W.2d 443, 446 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Tyler 1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.); TEX. R. Civ. P. 90.
18. TEX. R. Civ. P. 185.
19. Hassler v. Texas Gypsum Co., 525 S.W.2d 53, 54-55 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no
writ); Unit, Inc. v. Ten Eyck-Shaw, Inc., 524 S.W.2d 330, 332-34 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); US. Insulation Sales Corp. v. Jones-Blair Co., 491 S.W.2d 226, 227 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, no writ); Hancock v. O.K. Rental Equip. Co., 441 S.W.2d 955, 957
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1%9, no writ); Sekaly v. Hilton Center, Inc., 340 S.W.2d 827,
828 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1960, no writ).
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prove fatal to default judgments include the following: failure to plead the
defendant's residence;E" failure to properly plead agency;2 ' failure to plead
how service may be obtained; 22 failure to describe the accident sufficient-
ly;23 failure to state why the owner of property was responsible for pay-
ment; 24 inconsistency between the pleadings and a named party; 25 failure to
allege duty in a negligence case;26 general allegations of negligence; 27 failure
to plead facts giving the court jurisdiction over the person of the defend-
ant;28 failure to state whether damages claimed were personal or property
damages; 29 and a pleading that discloses on its face lack of capacity to sue. 30
Once a sufficient petition has been correctly filed and the requisite filing
fee paid, the clerk is required to issue citation promptly as requested by any
party. 3' The citation, among its other prescriptions, directs an officer to
serve the process on the defendant and commands the defendant to appear
in the lawsuit by filing a written answer by 10:00 a.m. on the Monday
following the expiration of twenty days from the date of service. 32 Once
citation has issued, jurisdiction must still be obtained over the person of the
defendant by service of that citation before a plaintiff can obtain a valid
default judgment against the defendant.
III. OBTAINING JURISDICTION OVER THE PERSON OF THE DEFENDANT
As jurisdiction over a defendant depends on effecting proper service of
citation, proof of such service must appear in the record. 33 In this regard, the
following statement of the Austin court of civil appeals is particularly
instructive:
To sustain a default judgment against attack based upon a claim of
invalid service of process, it is necessary to demonstrate a strict com-
pliance with the provided mode of service.
Though, ordinarily, presumptions are made in support of a judgment,
including presumptions of due service of citation when the judgment so
20. Spinnler v. Armstrong, 63 S.W.2d 1071 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1933, no writ).
21. Lopez v. Abalos, 484 S.W.2d 613, 615 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1972, no writ).
22. Mobile Pipe-Dillingham v. Stark, 468 S.W.2d 552, 553-54 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont
1971, no writ).
23. Ramfield v. Wilburn, 465 S.W.2d 844, 845 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1971, no
writ).
24. Simon v. L.D. Brinkman & Co., 449 S.W.2d 90, 92-93 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1969),
rev'd on other grounds, 459 S.W.2d 190 (Tex. 1970).
25. Hancock v. O.K. Rental Equip. Co., 441 S.W.2d 955, 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1969, no writ).
26. Schieffer v. Patterson, 440 S.W.2d 124, 126 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1969, no writ);
White Motor Co. v. Loden, 373 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963, no writ); White
v. Jackson, 358 S.W.2d 174, 177-79 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
27. Stinson v. Jones, 434 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1968, no writ).
28. Firence Footwear Co. v. Campbell, 411 S.W.2d 636, 638 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
29. White v. Jackson, 358 S.W.2d 174, 179 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
30. Rector v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 506 S.W.2d 6%, 698 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
31. TEX. R. Civ. P. 99.
32. TEX, R. Civ. P. 99, 101, 103.
33. Where personal service has been effected on the defendant the officer's return consti-
tutes proof of service. TEX. R. Civ. P. 107, 239. When a defendant is served under the long-arm
statute, proof of service may be supplied by filing with the court a certificate of service from
the secretary of state. Whitney v. L & L Realty Corp., 500 S.W.2d 94, 95-97 (Tex. 1973).
1977]
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recites . . . . no such presumptions are made in a direct attack on a
default judgment.34
The remainder of this section examines the various requirements and
methods for obtaining service of citation and discusses the kinds of defects
in the citation and the service thereof which have proven fatal in default
judgment situations. 35
A. Methods of Service of Process
Personal Service. Service of process, unless otherwise allowed, must be
made by the sheriff or constable delivering to the defendant, in person, a
copy of the citation with attached pleading. 36 The officer serving the citation
is required to endorse the date of delivery on the citation and return it to the
court.37 Before judgment by default may be entered, the citation with the
officer's return thereon must have been on file with the court at least ten
days, exclusive of the day of filing and the day of judgment. 31
The citation may be served by the sheriff or constable of any county in
which the party to be served may be found, 39 and the citation may be served
anywhere within the State of Texas. 40 The officer is bound to execute and
return the process without delay4 and is required by the citation to return it
unserved if service cannot be perfected within ninety days.42 When the
citation has not been served, the return must show the diligence used by the
officer to execute it, the cause of the failure to execute it, and the location of
the defendant if ascertainable.43
Service Under the Texas Long-Arm Statute. Article 2031b provides the
mechanism for service of citation upon a nonresident." Under article 203 lb
a nonresident is deemed to have appointed the secretary of state as his agent
for service of process if the nonresident is doing business in Texas but either
does not have an agent in the state or has an agent upon whom service has
been unsuccessfully attempted. Consequently, to show compliance with this
34. Prine v. American Hydrocarbons, Inc., 519 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1975, no writ).
35. But cf. TEX. R. Civ. P. 118 ("At any time in its discretion and upon such notice as it
deems just, the court may allow any process or proof of service thereof to be amended, unless it
clearly appears that material prejudice would result to substantial rights of the party against
whom the process issued.").
36. TEX. R. Civ. P. 106. When personal service is impractical, the court, upon motion, may
authorize some form of alternate service if done in a manner reasonably effective to give the
defendant fair notice of the suit. Id.; see notes 53-60 infra and accompanying text.
37. TEX. R. Civ. P. 106. Failure of the officer to note, on the copy of the citation given to
the defendant, the date service was perfected will not render the citation defective.
38. TEX. R. Civ. P. 107, 239; Gentry v. Gentry, No. 12,559 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin April
20, 1977).
39. TEX. R. Civ. P. 103. But no officer that is a party to or interested in the outcome of the
litigation is qualified to serve a citation. Id. See also TEX. R. Civ. P. 104.
40. TEX. R. Civ. P. 102.
41. TEX. R. Civ. P. 105. Process issued and served prior to filing of petition is a nullity.
Moorhead v. Transportation Bank, 62 S.W.2d 184, 185-86 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1933, no
writ). See 53 TEX. JUR. 2D Sunday and Holidays § 22, at 554 (1964) as to effect of service of
process on Sunday or legal holidays.
42. TEX. R. Civ. P. 101. Service of citation more than 90 days old is void. Lemothe v.
Cimbalista, 236 S.W.2d 681, 682 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1951, writ ref'd).
43. TEX. R. Civ. P. 107.
44. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 203 1b (Vernon 1964).
[Vol. 31
JUDGMENTS BY DEFAULT
statute plaintiff must allege in his petition that defendant engages in business
in the state but does not maintain a regular place of business or an agent who
can be served in the state, and that the defendant as a result of such action is
deemed to have appointed the secretary of state as his agent for service of
process. 45 To insure jurisdiction, facts concerning the nature of the business
engaged in by the defendant should be stated in the plaintiff's petition.
6
Proof of service upon the secretary of state and his forwarding of process
to the defaulting defendant is mandatory and a certificate affirming these
facts may be obtained from the secretary of state for a nominal charge 7.4 The
secretary of state's certificate or other proof of service must be filed before
a final default judgment is entered.48 Proof of service is jurisdictional, and
an attempt to cure a jurisdictional defect by filing proof of service at a
post-judgment hearing is futile.49 Moreover, courts do not engage in a
presumption of regularity regarding the standard jurisdictional recitations in
default judgment cases, 50 but rather require that jurisdiction of the trial court
appear affirmatively on the face of the record.5
45. McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 929 (Tex. 1965); Firence Footwear Co. v. Camp-
bell, 411 S.W.2d 636, 638 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.). TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 2031b, § 3 (Vernon 1964) reads as follows:
Any . . . non-resident natural person that engages in business in this State...
and does not maintain a place of regular business in this State or a designated
agent upon whom service may be made. . . the act or acts of engaging in such
business . . . shall be deemed equivalent to an appointment . . . of the Secre-
tary of State of Texas as agent upon whom service of process may be made
46. The following allegations are sufficent when coupled with a statement of the facts
regarding defendant's business activities in the State of Texas:
Defendant is a Louisiana Corporation doing business in the State of Texas
with its headquarters, principal place of business, and home office in New
Orleans, Louisiana. Defendant does not maintain a place of regular business in
this state or a designated agent upon whom service may be made. Defendant
may be served with citation by service upon the Secretary of State, his ap-
pointed agent, as provided in TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2031b (1964).
Defendant may be given notice of the pendency of this suit by the Secretary of
State mailing process to the aforementioned office as follows:
Defendant (name)
Post Office Box XXX
New Orleans, Louisiana
47. Whitney v. L & L Realty Corp., 500 S.W.2d 94, 96-97 (Tex. 1973); Prine v. American
Hydrocarbons, Inc., 519 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ). Service is
complete when the secretary of state mails the citation and accompanying petition. Texas Real
Estate Comm'n v. Howard, 538 S.W.2d 429, 433 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1976,
writ ref'd n.r.e.). Service is effected on the secretary of state by the sheriff of Travis County,
Texas. The secretary of state requires two copies of the petition and the standard service fee.
48. In setting aside the judgment in Whitney the supreme court held that "a showing in the
record that the secretary of state forwarded a copy of the process is essential" to establish
personal jurisdiction and for this purpose the filing of the secretary's certificate would suffice.
500 S.W.2d at 96. There is no suggestion in Whitney that the secretary of state's certificate is
the exclusive means of making the requisite showing or that other proof will not suffice. The
policy of Whitney is simply that "defendants ought not to be cast in personal judgment without
notice." Id. at 97.
49. Prine v. American Hydrocarbons, Inc., 519 S.W.2d 520, 522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1975, no writ). In Prine the court stated: "If the trial court did not have jurisdiction over the
person of Prine at the time of the entry of the default judgment, jurisdiction could not then be
created upon the basis of proof of service that was introduced after the entry of judgment being
attacked." Id. at 522. But see 47 AM. JtJR. 2D Judgments § 1174, at 198 (1969).
50. Flynt v. City of Kingsville, 125 Tex. 510, 511, 82 S.W.2d 934, 935 (1935); see note 34
supra and accompanying text.
51. McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 930 (Tex. 1965); Flynt v. City of Kingsville, 125
Tex. 510, 511, 82 S.W.2d 934, 935 (1935); Firence Footwear Co. v. Campbell, 411 S.W.2d 636,
637 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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Substituted Service of Citation. Rule 106 authorizes substituted service if
the plaintiff first moves that the court allow substituted service and shows
that it is impractical to secure personal service. 2 Normally, the evidence
adduced at this hearing will consist of testimony by the officer who attempt-
ed service that he has been unable to effectuate service on defendant and
evidence that the alternate method of service selected will likely reach the
defendant.5 3 This evidence must be stenographically recorded so as to allow
the defendant an opportunity to challenge the sufficiency of plaintiff's
evidence.54 Further, the order authorizing substituted service of citation
must specify the method of substituted service allowed and must direct that
a new citation issue according to the court's instructions. In a default
situation the record must reflect strict compliance with rule 106 and the
mode of substituted service specified by the court. 5
Rule 106 permits several forms of substituted service. The court may
authorize substituted service by leaving a copy of the citation with attached
petition at the usual place of business of the party to be served, by delivering
it to anyone over sixteen years of age at the person's usual abode, by
registered or certified mail, or in any other manner which will be reasonably
effective to give defendant notice of the suit.5 6 Rule 106, however, does
require that the substitute service ordered by the court be that most likely to
reach the defendant.5 7
Service by Publication. Service of citation by publication is authorized in
Texas, 58 and its mechanics are recited in rules 114 through 116. 59 A judgment
by default, however, is not allowed when service is by publication. 60 For this
reason, rule 244 requires that the court appoint an attorney to defend the suit
on behalf of the non-answering defendant served by publication, 61 and rule
812 requires that in such cases the facts entitling plaintiff to judgment must
be exhibited to the court at the time of trial. 62
B. Defects in the Citation
No judgment can be entered against a defendant who has not been duly
served. 63 Strict rules have been established by the courts for testing the
52. TEX. R. Civ. P. 106. See also David A. Carl Enterprises, Inc. v. Crow-Shutt No. 14,
Docket No. 16,851 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] March 17, 1977).
53. Id.
54. Spencer v. Texas Factors, Inc., 366 S.W.2d 699, 700-01 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
55. Kirkegaard v. First City Nat'l Bank, 486 S.W.2d 893, 894-95 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1972, no writ); Spencer v. Texas Factors, Inc., 366 S.W.2d 699, 700-01 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.); see Gianelle v. Morgan, 514 S.W.2d 133, 134 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Texarkana 1974, no writ); Crawford v. Brown, 507 S.W.2d 574, 575 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1974, no writ).
56. TEX. R. Civ. P. 106.
57. Forney v. Jorrie, 511 S.W.2d 379, 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Kirkegaard v. First City Nat'l Bank, 486 S.W.2d 893, 894-95 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1972, no writ).
58. TEX. R. Civ. P. 110.
59. TEX. R. Civ. P. 114-116.
60. TEX. R. Civ. P. 812; McCarthy v. Jesperson, 527 S.W.2d 825, 826 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1975, no writ).
61. TEX. R. Civ. P. 244.
62. TEX. R. Civ. P. 812.
63. TEX. R. Civ. P. 124.
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validity of citations to insure that a defendant receives proper notice of any
proceeding commenced against him.' Thus, regardless of which method of
service is utilized, the slightest defect in a citation may be fatal, for Texas
courts traditionally have been quick to find errors in a citation sufficient to
set aside a default judgment. Examples of such errors include: failure to
disclose the manner of service; 65 failure to state the date of service, 66 or
stating an impossible date; 7 failure to state the date citation was issued; 68
failure to state correctly the date of filing suit;69 failure to state the correct
date that defendant's answer is due; 70 incorrect statement of defendant's
name;7 incorrect statement of plaintiff's name; 72 failure to disclose the
identity of the person served ;73 failure to disclose capacity to accept service
64. 1 H. BLACK, supra note 7, § 324.
65. Continental Ins. Co. v. Milliken, 64 Tex. 46, 47-48 (1885) (citation failed to state the
manner of service or that it was on the local agent of a corporate defendant); Sun Mut. Ins. Co.
v. Seeligson, 59 Tex. 3, 6-7 (1883) (citation failed to state the manner of service and failed to
command the defendant to appear); Graves v. Robertson, 22 Tex. 130, 133 (1858) (citation
failed to state the manner or time of service); Carlson Boat Works v. Hauck, 459 S.W.2d 887,
888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [ist Dist.] 1970, no writ) (citation initially stated the manner of
service but then used the qualifying words "by serving"); Diamond Chem. Co. v. Sonoco
Prods. Co., 437 S.W.2d 307, 308 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968, no writ) (citation
showed service on a corporation by serving an individual who was not otherwise described and
the manner of service was not described); T-P Investment Corp. v. Winter, 400 S.W.2d 957, 958
(Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1966, writ dism'd) (citation failed to state the manner of service and the
identity of the person served as agent for a corporate defendant); Hyltin-Manor Funeral Home,
Inc. v. Hill, 304 S.W.2d 469,470 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1957, no writ) (citation failed to
state the manner of service or that anything was delivered to the president of the corporation as
agent for service); Miller v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 184 S.W. 614, 618 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1916, no writ) (citation in an action against a partnership failed to state the
manner of service and failed to identify the person served).
66. Sloan v. Batte, 46 Tex. 215, 216 (1876); Williams v. Downes, 30 Tex. 51, 52 (1867);
Roberts v. Stockslager, 4 Tex. 307, 308-10 (1849) (return of citation failed to show the date or
place of service); Fitzpatrick v. Dorris Bros., 284 S.W. 303, 304 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland
1926, no writ) (ambiguity as to which of two dates served); Robinson v. Horton, 81 S.W. 1044,
1044-45 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904, no writ) (failure to show the date and failure to affix the seal).
67. Covingtons v. Burleson, 28 Tex. 368, 371 (1866) ("the second Monday after the tenth
Monday in March"); Friend v. Thomas, 187 S.W. 986, 987-88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1916, no writ) (a writ showing execution of citation upon the 19th day of July, A.D. 191); Texas
State Fair & Dallas Exposition v. Lyon, 24 S.W. 328 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893, no writ) (petition
filed Feb. 26, 1892, and served Feb. 20, 1892).
68. Hance v. Cogswell, 307 S.W.2d 277, 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1957, no writ).
69. Pruitt v. State, 92 Tex. 434, 435, 49 S.W. 366, 367 (1899); Hance v. Cogswell, 307
S.W.2d 277, 278-79 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1957, no writ); George v. Elledge, 261 S.W.2d 201
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1953, no writ).
70. Watson v. Miller, 55 Tex. 289, 292 (1881); Tobler v. Stubblefield, 32 Tex. 188, 189
(1869); Foster v. Christensen, 67 S.W.2d 246, 253 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1934, holding approved);
Heard v. J. & C. Drilling Co., 124 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1939, writ
dism'd).
71. Southern Pacific Co. v. Block Bros., 84 Tex. 21, 22, 19 S.W. 300, 301 (1892) (citation
directed to Southern Pacific Railway Co., a different entity from Southern Pacific Co.);
Hendon v. Pugh, 46 Tex. 211, 212 (1876) (citation named J.W. Hendon and return showed
service on J.N. Hendon); Faver v. Robinson, 46 Tex. 204, 205 (1876) (citation directed to
"Favers," judgment against "Faver"); Brown-McKee, Inc. v. J.F. Bryan & Assoc., 522
S.W.2d 958, 959 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, no writ) (citation directed to Brown McKee
Const. Co. instead of Brown-McKee, Inc.); Nail v. Gene Biddle Feed Co., 347 S.W.2d 830, 831
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1961, no writ) (citation to "B.F. Nail," judgment against his father
"Frank Nail"); Zimmerman v. First Nat'l Bank, 235 S.W.2d 720, 722-24 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (transposition of the garnishee's initials destroys default judgment
based on the writ, "T.W." instead of "W.T.").
72. Firman Leather Goods Corp. v. McDonald & Shaw, 217 S.W.2d 137, 141 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1948, no writ) (J.B. George, McDonald & Shaw instead of J.B. McDonald and
George Shaw); Heard v. J. & C. Drilling Co., 124 S.W.2d 866 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1939, writ dism'd).
73. Holcomb & Hoke Mfg. Co. v. Amason, 2 S.W.2d 360, 362 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
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as an agent; 74 failure to state what was delivered to defendant; 7 failure to
state service on each defendant in a multiple defendant siuation; 76 failure to
state service in the county which the citation designates; 77 when the citation
affirmatively negates service; 71 failure to state the correct location of the
court; 79 incorrectly stating the cause number of the suit;80 service on an
individual where a corporation is the defendant;8' failure to affix the seal; 2
failure to state the file number;8 3 failure to state that the citation was not
served by a sheriff or constable, but instead was served by a tax collector;
8 4
failure of process server to affirm that he was disinterested in connection
with service of an out-of-state citation; 5 and failure to command defendant
Antonio 1927, no writ) (return merely recited that sheriff had served citation on defendant's
agent).
74. Harmon & Reid v. Quin, 258 S.W.2d 441, 442 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1953, no
writ) (failure to sufficiently allege that person named would be a proper agent for service);
National Ben Franklin Fire Ins. Co. v. Scott, 214 S.W. 604, 605 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1919, no writ) (petition alleged cause of action against a foreign fire insurance company having
an agent in Texas; return service showed service upon a partner but did not affirmatively show
that the partner served was also a local agent); Remington-Rand Bus. Serv., Inc. v. Angelo
Printing Co., 31 S.W.2d 1098 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1930, no writ) (neither pleading, citation,
nor return showed that party upon whom service was had was such agent as statutes required
for service on a foreign corporation).
75. Woodall v. Lansford, 254 S.W.2d 540, 542-43 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1953, no
writ) (return failed to state that a true and correct copy of plaintiff's petition was delivered to
defendant); Midwest Piping & Supply Co. v. Page, 128 S.W.2d 459, 462 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1939, writ ref'd) (citation directed that a certified copy of plaintiff's original petition
be served while return failed to state that a certified copy was served); Price v. Black Bros., 19
S.W.2d 847 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1929, no writ) (return failed to state what the officer
delivered to the defendant); Grammar v. State, 89 Tex. Crim. 188, 190,230 S.W. 165, 166 (1921)
(citation stated "came to hand on the 23rd day of January, 1920, and executed on the 2nd day of
February, 1920, by delivering to the within names").
76. Holliday v. Steele, 65 Tex. 388, 389 (1886) ("[C]ame on to hand ... a true copy of this
writ..."); King v. Goodson, 42 Tex. 152, 153 (1875) ("[C]ame to hand ... a certified copy of
plaintiff's petition..."); Willis v. Bryan, 33 Tex. 429 (1870); State v. Davis, 139 S.W.2d 63&,
640 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1940, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.) ("by delivering a copy of the
above notice" to defendants); Fitzpatrick v. Dorris Bros., 284 S.W. 303, 304 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1926, no writ) (return stated that it was executed on May 16, by delivering to D.
& C. May 27 "the within named defendant"); Martin v. Hawkins, 238 S.W. 991,992 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1922, writ ref'd) (return of service on several defendants stating that it was
served "by delivering to the within named defendant in person a true copy . . ."); Kellam v.
Trail, 185 S.W. 988 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1916, no writ) (return showing service of citation
by delivering to two defendants "in person a true copy"); Duke v. Spiller, 111 S.W. 787 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1908, no writ) (return showed that but one copy of the citation was delivered to two
defendants, "a true copy of this writ"); Mahan v. McManus, 102 S.W. 789, 790 (Tex. Civ. App.
1907, no writ) (citation named three defendants and the return stated that it was executed "by
delivering to the within named defendant in person a true copy of the citation"); Russell v.
Butler, 71 S.W. 395 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902, no writ) (return stated "came to hand" on a certain
day "and executed" on a named day "by delivering to C.R. & M.R., the within defendants, in
person, a true copy of the citation").
77. Douthit v. Martin, 39 S.W. 944, 945 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, no writ) (service was by
sheriff of the county (Harris) in which defendant was living but citation was issued from and
directed to the sheriff of Travis county).
78. Holland v. Wood, 196 S.W. 309 (Tex. Civ. App-El Paso 1917, no writ) (return
affirmatively showed defendant "not found" by sheriff for service of citation).
79. Crenshaw v. Hempel, 130 S.W. 731, 733 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, no writ).
80. Durham v. Betterton, 79 Tex. 223, 224, 14 S.W. 1060, 1060-61 (1891); Beck v. Nelson,
17 S.W.2d 144, 145 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1929, writ dism'd); Atkinson v. Leonard, 287
S.W. 525 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1926, no writ); Crenshaw v. Hempel, 130 S.W. 731,733
(Tex. Civ. App. 1910, no writ); Duke v. Spiller, I I I S.W. 787 (Tex. Civ. App, 1908, no writ).
81. Firman Leather Goods Corp. v. McDonald & Shaw, 217 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso 1948, no writ); Whitaker Chevrolet Co. v. Blacksher, 132 S.W.2d 425 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1939, no writ).
82. Robinson v. Horton, 81 S.W. 1044, 1045 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904, no writ).
83. Duke v. Spiller, Ill S.W. 787 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908, no writ).
84. Turner v. Ephraim, 28 S.W.2d 608, 609 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1930, no writ).




As indicated above, the courts have developed a highly technical standard
for reviewing citations. The common error in citations of failing to disclose
the manner of service illustrates the courts' use of rule 124 to set aside
default judgments. In T-P Investment Corp. v. Winter,"7 for instance, the
citation evidencing the sheriff's return recited that a true copy of the citation
with plaintiff's petition was delivered to defendant.88 The sheriff's return,
however, failed to disclose the manner of service.89 The court held this
omission alone constituted a fatal defect under rule 10790 even though the
return included the name of the corporation, date of service, time of service,
and mileage. 9 As a result of this error, the default judgment in Winter was
reversed. 92
Situations involving service on an agent are also a particularly trouble-
some area. Plaintiff's petition in Kay's Jewelers, Inc. v. Sikes Senter Corp. 93
alleged that defendant was "an Oklahoma corporation duly qualified to do
business in Texas, maintaining its resident agent for service, one Jerry
Alexander, of Texarkana, Texas." The sheriff's return reflected service on
"Kay's Jewelers, Jerry Alexander as agent." 94 The court reversed the
judgment by default because plaintiff's petition had alleged Jerry Alexander
was a resident agent instead of a registered agent. 95 Similarly, courts have
reversed default judgments for the failure to correctly state the defendant's
name. 96 For example, in Brown-McKee, Inc. v. J.F. Bryan & Associates9 7
the court reversed a default judgment because the sheriff's return indicated
service on Brown-McKee Construction Co. instead of Brown-McKee, Inc.
A motion to quash service is the proper method for challenging defects in
service of citations prior to the entry of judgment.98 But even if the citation
86. Stafford Constr. Co. v. Martin, 531 S.W.2d 667,668 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1975, no
writ).
87. 400 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1966, writ dism'd).
88. Id. at 958.
89. Id.
90. TEX. R. Civ. P. 107.
91. T-P Investment Corp. v. Winter, 400 S.W.2d 957, 958 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1966,
writ dism'd).
92. Id. at 959.
93. 444 S.W.2d 219 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1969, no writ).
94. Id. at 221.
95. Id.
96. See note 78 supra and accompanying text.
97. 522 S.W.2d 958 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, no writ).
98. TEX. R. Civ. P. 122. A special appearance is not the proper way to challenge defects or
errors in obtaining jurisdiction over the person or property of the defendant. Goldman v.
Pre-Fab Transit Co., 520 S.W.2d 597, 598 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ);
8 R. STAYTON, TEXAS FORMS § 4716, Comment, at 65 (Supp. 1976); Thode, In Personam
Jurisdiction; Article 2031b, The Texas "Long-Arm "Jurisdiction Statute; and the Appearance to
Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEXAS L. REV. 279, 313 (1964). But see
Gathers v. Walpace Co., 544 S.W.2d 169, 170-71 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, no writ);
Castle v. Berg, 415 S.W.2d 523 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1967, no writ). When a party makes a
special appearance under rule 120a, all objections to jurisdiction, including method of service,
are waived if the party is amenable to process issued by the courts of this state. TEX. R. Civ. P.
120a(3). Having specially appeared, the only jurisdictional issue which defendant may assert on
appeal is his amenability to service of process. This is not a harsh result. By utilizing the special
appearance procedure, a party quite properly admits that he has notice of the suit and it is not
inappropriate for him to confine his attack to the jurisdiction of the court over his person or
property. This is a small price to pay for the privilege of specially appearing for the purpose of




is quashed, the defendant shall be deemed to have entered his appearance at
10:00 a.m. on the Monday following the expiration of twenty days after the
day on which the citation is quashed. 9 Since the defendant is thus deemed to
have been duly served so as to require him to appear and answer at that time
or suffer a judgment by default,' °° the only real value of a motion to quash
citation is to obtain additional time to answer. Since a defendant could just
as easily file a general denial, 10 this motion is of little utility.
A party to an action who enters a general appearance cannot thereafter
ignore the action and expect by such conduct to prevent the court from
acting; having appeared in a suit, a defendant'is presumed to be present in
court and aware of all subsequent proceedings in the cause. i02 Therefore,
even if service of process was defective, a defendant may waive any
objections he may have had as to the method jurisdiction was obtained over
his person by generally appearing. 03 Such an appearance is entered
whenever the defendant invokes the jurisdiction of the court without being
compelled to do so by a previous ruling of the court sustaining
jurisdiction."' 4
IV. ENTRY OF JUDGMENT
A. Failure to Answer
A party who has been properly served must answer or otherwise plead by
10:00 a.m. on appearance day.'05 If a defendant fails to answer or has his
pleadings stricken, 106 the case is ripe for the entry of a judgment by default.
But before a default judgment may properly be entered, the record must
contain proof of the circumstances surrounding service in order to show
compliance with the rules. If the citation was personally served, the citation
with the officer's return thereon must have been on file with the court for
ten days, exclusive of the day of filing and the day of judgment.'07 If service
The Texas special appearance rule, however, does not address the issue of when a defendant
must file his answer after the overruling of his special appearance. In the authors' opinion a
defendant's answer is due immediately upon the overruling of his special appearance. This
approach finds support in rule 101 which states that an answer is due 20 days after the service of
citation. Rule 120a has no provision extending the time within which to answer following the
overruling of a motion challenging the court's jurisdiction over the person or property of the
defendant. Requiringan answer upon the overruling of defendant's special appearance is not
unreasonable because rule 120a(l) expressly provides that any other plea, pleading or motion
may either be contained in the jurisdictional motion or filed subsequent thereto without waiver
of the special nature of the appearance.
99. TEX. R. Civ. P. 122.
100. Id.
101. TEX. R. Civ. P. 92.
102. Carter v. G & L Tool Co. of Utah, Inc., 428 S.W.2d 677, 683 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1968, no'writ); accord, Thompson v. Alford, 20 Tex. 491, 492 (1857).
103. E.g., Republic Oil & Gas Co. v. Owen, 210 S.W. 319, 320-21 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1919, writ ref'd); 2 R. McDONALD. supra note 5, § 9.04, at 366; 6 C.J.S. Appearances § 35
(1975).
104. E.g., St. Louis & S.R.R. v. Hale, 109 Tex. 251, 206 S.W. 75 (1918); Toler v. Travis
County Child Welfare Unit, 520 S.W.2d 834, 836 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); 2 R. McDONALD, supra note 5, § 9.04, at 366.
105. Andrus v. Andrus, 168 S.W.2d 891 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1943, no writ); TEX. R.
Civ. P. 101.
106. TEX. R. Civ. P. 215(a)(1); Annot., 6 A.L.R.3d 713 (1966); Annot., 14 A.L.R.2d 580
(1950); 99 L. Ed. 54 (1955).
107. TEX. R. Civ. P. 107, 239; Flynt v. City of Kingsville, 125 Tex. 510, 511-12, 82 S.W.2d
934, 935 (1935).
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was effected pursuant to the Texas long-arm statute, proof of service on the
secretary of state must be on file with the court before a final default
judgment is entered."0 8 When personal service is effected on a foreign
corporation that is qualified to do business in Texas, service must be upon
its agent; 1°9 proof of this agency must be adduced in order to sustain a
default judgment."10 In addition, the default judgment request must be
accompanied by a non-military affidavit 1 ' and a certificate of last known
mailing address." 2 Once judgment has been entered, the clerk will mail a
postcard notice of the judgment to the defendant at the address provided by
counsel in his certificate of last known mailing address." 3
A default judgment is interlocutory if one or more of the defendants
answer." 4 Since the requirements of Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines,
Inc. "' do not apply as long as the judgment remains interlocutory, the trial
court's exercise of discretion in setting the judgment aside during this time is
not reviewable." 6 If the judgment is interlocutory in nature, the plaintiff
may sever the causes of action," 7 non-suit the answering defendants," 8 or
proceed to trial against the answering defendants." 9 Final judgment, how-
ever, can be entered only after all the claims of all the parties have been
resolved. 2
0
B. Entry of a Judgment on Amended Pleadings
After the petition is filed and served a defendant who fails to answer must
be notified of all changes substantively affecting the litigation.' 2' Increasing
the amount of plaintiff's demand, 22 alleging a new cause of action,' 23 or the
addition of new parties by amendment or intervention, 24 require notice to a
defendant already served; a default judgment, however, will not be set aside
108. Whitney v. L & L Realty Corp., 500 S.W.2d 94, 96 (Tex. 1973); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT.
ANN. art. 2031(b) (Vernon 1964).
109. Investors Diversified Servs., Inc. v. Bruner, 366 S.W.2d 810, 812-13 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston 1963, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
110. Anglo Mexicana de Seguros, S.A. v. Elizondo, 405 S.W.2d 722, 725 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1966, writ ref'd n.r.e.); White Motor Co. v. Loden, 373 S.W.2d 862, 865 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1963, no writ).
Il1. 50 U.S.C. § 520 (1970).
112. TEX. R. Civ. P. 239a.
113. Lee v. Thomas, 534 S.W.2d 422, 427 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
114. TEX. R. Civ. P. 240.
115. 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124 (1939).
116. Stone v. Enstam, 541 S.W.2d 473, 478 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ); City of
Wichita Falls v. Dye, 517 S.W.2d 680,682 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
117. TEX. R. Civ. P. 174(b).
118. TEX. R. Civ. P. 164.
119. TEX. R. Civ. P. 240.
120. County of Harris v. Black, 448 S.W.2d 859, 860 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
1970, no writ); I H. BLACK, supra note 7, §§ 23, 24.
121. 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 194, at 340 (1947).
122. Weatherford v. Van Alstyne, 22 Tex. 22 (1858); Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Head, 48
S.W.2d 464, 465 (Tex. Civ. App.-1932, writ dism'd); Hittson v. Gentry, 22 S.W. 70 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1893, no writ).
123. Mann v. Mathews, 82 Tex. 98, 17 S.W. 927 (1891); McNeil v. Childress & Folts, 34
Tex. 370 (1870); Morrison v. Walker, 22 Tex. 18, 20 (1858); Note, Pleading and Practice-
Amendments to Petitions-What Constitutes a New Cause of Action, 7 TEXAS L. REV. 144
(1928).
124. Liquid Carbonic Co. v. Head, 48 S.W.2d 464, 465 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1932, writ
dism'd); Jenness v. First Nat'l Bank, 256 S.W. 634, 635 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923, no writ); Barrett
v. McKinney, 93 S.W. 240, 242 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906, no writ).
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if plaintiff neglects to notify defendant of purely formal amendments.' 25
While there is authority that notification of substantive changes must be by
service of process, 12 6 the Texas rules of civil procedure would also seem to
sanction notification by registered mail.' 27 If judgment has been entered on a
substantively amended pleading, the propriety of reforming the judgment to
conform with the original demand has been questioned. 128
C. Proving Damages
When a claim is liquidated and proved by an instrument in writing,
damages will be assessed by the court. 129 A court will treat a claim as
liquidated if it is well-pleaded and the amount of damages can be calculated
from plaintiff's petition and an instrument in writing. 130 Pleadings, even if
sworn, do not constitute proper default judgment evidence if unaccom-
panied by a written instrument.' 3 ' Common examples of liquidated claims
include suits on promissory notes,' leases, 3  bonds, 3 4 checks,' and
sworn accounts. 136
Unliquidated damages, however, are treated differently. A judgment by
default does not automatically accept as true allegations pertaining to unliq-
uidated damages 13 or those damages which are uncertain in nature or
require more than mere mathematical computation from the pleadings and
the instrument in writing. In these situations rule 243 requires the court to
hear evidence as to damages. 38 Consequently, to warrant entry of a default
125. Spencer v. McCarty, 46 Tex. 213, 215 (1877); Morrison v. Walker, 22 Tex. 18, 20
(1858); Ellis v. Mabry, 60 S.W. 571 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901, no writ); McConnel v. Foscue, 24
S.W. 964, 965 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, no writ).
126. Phillips v. The Maccabees, 50 S.W.2d 478, 479 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1932, no writ);
Jenness v. First Nat'l Bank, 256 S.W. 634, 635 (Tex. Civ. App. 1923, no writ).
127. TEX. R. Civ. P. 21a, 63, 72, 810. Contra, Hodges, Collateral Attacks on Judgments, 41
TEXAS L. REV. 499, 508 (1963).
128. Compare Weatherford v. Van Alstyne, 22 Tex. 22 (1858), with Liquid Carbonic Co. v.
Head, 48 S.W.2d 464, 465 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1932, writ dism'd).
129. TEX. R. Civ. P. 241.
130. Freeman v. Leasing Associates, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston
[14th Dist.] 1974, no writ); see FED. R. Civ. P. 55(b)(1).
131. Hughes v. Jones, 543 S.W.2d 885, 886 (Tex. Civ. App.-EI Paso 1976, no writ); Odom
v. Pinkston, 193 S.W.2d 888, 891 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.); R.R. Dancy
& Co. v. Rosenberg, 174 S.W. 831, 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1915, no writ).
132. Loungeway v. Hale, 73 Tex. 495, 11 S.W. 537 (1889); Wallace v. Snyder Nat'l Bank,
527 S.W.2d 485, 487 (Tex. Civ, App.-Eastland 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Odom v. Pinkston, 193
S.W.2d 888, 890 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
133. See Freeman v. Leasing Associates, Inc., 503 S.W.2d 406, 408 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ).
134. Buttrill v. Occidental Life Ins. Co., 45 S.W.2d 636, 637, 639 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas
1931, no writ) (since damages were liquidated "the right to a jury trial did not exist").
135. Farley v. Clark Equip. Co., 484 S.W.2d 142, 149 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
136. O'Brien v. Cole, 532 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ); Alexan-
der v. Texoma Wholesale Jewelers, 307 S.W.2d 631, 632 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1957, writ
ref'd n.r.e.); Colorado River Syndicate Subscribers v. Alexander, 288 S.W. 586, 587 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1926, no writ); TEX. R. Civ. P. 185. The requisites of rule 185 are, however,
strictly construed. Hassler v. Texas Gypsum Co., 525 S.W.2d 53, 54-55 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1975, no writ); Big K Furniture Co. v. The Covey Co., 511 S.W.2d 329, 330 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1974, no writ).
137. TEX. R. Civ. P. 243; Maywald Trailer Co. v. Perry, 238 S.W.2d 826, 827 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Galveston 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Southern S.S. Co. v. Schumacher, 154 S.W.2d 283,
284 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1941, writ ref'd w.o.m.).
138. TEX. R. Civ. P. 243; 3 A. FREEMAN, supra note 7, § 1287, at 2673. See also FED. R. Civ.
P. 55(b)(2). No evidence is required to support the award of an attorney's fee within the
minimum prescribed by the state bar minimum fee schedule if the case falls within the ambit of
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judgment when damages are unliquidated a plaintiff must present competent
evidence of his damages consistent with the cause of action pleaded.
39
When the issue of damages is tried defendant is entitled to participate
fully by cross-examining plaintiff's witnesses and offering evidence in re-
buttal for the purpose of reducing damages."4 The defendant is also entitled
to a jury trial on the issue of unliquidated damages if he makes a proper
demand. 4 ' A defendant who fails to appear at the time unliquidated dam-
ages are proved may, however, waive these rights.
142
Following judgment, the sufficiency of plaintiff's evidence is subject to
review on appeal. 14 3 This review is based on the statement of facts prepared
by the trial court. 44 For this reason it has long been established that if an
appellant exercises due diligence and is unable to obtain a statement of
facts, he is entitled to a new trial in order to preserve his right to an effective
appellate review.11 5 In the leading case of Victory v. Hamilton'46 the com-
mission of appeals stated the rule in the following manner:
The appealing party is entitled to a statement of facts in question and
answer form, and if, through no fault of his own, after the exercise of
due diligence, he is unable to procure such a statement of facts, his right
to have the cause reviewed on appeal can be preserved to him in no
other way than by a retrial of the case.
47
The most troublesome portion of this rule is the statement that the inabili-
ty of an appellant to procure a statement of facts must be "through no fault
of his own, after the exercise of due diligence." The majority view requires
the appellant to make at least a diligent effort to procure an agreed, ab-
breviated, or narrative statement of facts.14 Some courts have gone so far as
TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2226 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77). O'Brien v. Cole, 532 S.W.2d 151,
153-54 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ).
139. Schoenberg v. Forrest, 253 S.W.2d 331, 335-36 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1952, no
writ); 3 A. FREEMAN, supra note 7, § 1292, at 2683; 47 AM. JUR. 2D Judgments § 1176, at 199
(1969).
140. Rainwater v. Haddox, 544 S.W.2d 729,733 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1976, no writ); I
H. BLACK, supra note 7, § 91; 4 R. McDONALD, supra note 5, § 17.23.4, at 122; see Maywald
Trailer Co. v. Perry, 238 S.W.2d 826, 828 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
St. Louis S.W. Ry. v. Denson, 26 S.W. 265, 266 (Tex. Civ. App. 1894, no writ).
141. Bumpass v. Morrison, 70 Tex. 756, 759, 8 S.W. 596,597-98 (1888); White Motor Co. v.
Loden, 373 S.W.2d 863, 865-66 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963, no writ); Western Union Tel. Co.
v. Skinner, 128 S.W. 715, 716 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ ref'd); TEX. R. Civ. P. 243; see TEX.
CONST. art. I, § 15.
142. Green v. W.E. Grace Mfg. Co., 422 S.W.2d 723, 726 (Tex. 1968); TEX. R. Civ. P. 220.
143. Morgan Express, Inc. v. Elizabeth-Perkins, Inc., 525 S.W.2d 312, 314 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd); Brown v. Brown, 520 S.W.2d 571, 576 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd); Johnson v. Brown, 218 S.W.2d 317, 320 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Beaumont 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
144. Wallace v. Snyder Nat'l Bank, 527 S.W.2d 485, 488 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Dugie v. Dugie, 511 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no
writ); Justice Life Ins. Co. v. Walker, 508 S.W.2d 434, 438 (Tex. Civ. App.-Forth Worth 1974,
writ ref'd n.r.e.).
145. E.g., Robinson v. Robinson, 487 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Tex. 1972); Parker v. Sabine Valley
Lumber Co., 485 S.W.2d 853, 855 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, no writ); Pacific
Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Burgess, 118 S.W.2d 1100, 1102-03 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1938,
writ ref'd) (appellant, appellee, and trial judge each submitted his own statement of facts);
Joachim v. Hamilton, 186 S.W. 251, 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1916, writ dism'd).
146. 127 Tex. 203, 91 S.W.2d 697 (1936).
147. Id. at 209, 91 S.W.2d at 700.
148. E.g., Robinson v. Robinson, 487 S.W.2d 713, 715 (Tex. 1972); Bledsoe v. Black, 535
S.W.2d 795, 796-97 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ); Phillips v. Phillips, 532 S.W.2d
161, 163 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ); Ducoff v. Ducoff, 523 S.W.2d 264, 267 (Tex.
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to require that the appellant mandamus the trial judge or court reporter to
demonstrate his due diligence. 4 9 Conversely, other cases have construed
the due diligence language of Victory v. Hamilton more liberally. 150 In a case
where the statement of facts was lost in an appeal from an instructed
verdict, one court stated:
Attached to Appellee's Motion for Rehearing is an affidavit of the
trial judge to the effect that if requested he could and would have
prepared a statement of facts. We have no doubt as to the honesty and
integrity of the trial court; however, since his mind has already been
made up in favor of the Defendant-Appellees, it places an unfair burden
upon Appellant to have to rely on the trial court for his statement of
facts. Likewise, in our opinion, to require the Appellant to have to
depend upon the successful parties for an agreement as to a statement
of facts is not calculated to be productive of a statement of facts
sufficient for our purposes of review.
We need a question and answer statement of facts as produced
verbatim from the spoken words of both counsel and witnesses, which
will furnish a true 'negative' of the facts introduced, unblemished by
human interpolation. Regardless of his honesty and integrity, the trialjudge is subject to all the weaknesses of human nature and the frailties
of the human mind in reproducing from memory the testimony in-
troduced in a trial.
A close examination of Rule 377 T.R.C.P. reveals to us that this rule
presupposes the availability of the official court reporter's shorthand
notes, and that the procedures required by and provided for therein
should be interpreted in this light.'
While it has been difficult to discern the proper application of the Victory
v. Hamilton rule in non-default judgment cases, its application in a default
judgment situation has been even more difficult. There is a clear division
among the courts of civil appeals' 52 on the question of whether a defaulting
defendant waives his right to a statement of facts when he does not en-
deavor to procure a statement of facts in an alternate form in situations in
which they are unavailable in question-and-answer form. Some courts have
applied the "due diligence" test 153 while others have held that a defaulting
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, no writ); Whatley v. Whatley, 493 S.W.2d 299, 301 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Dallas 1973, no writ); Parker v. Sabine Valley Lumber Co., 485 S.W.2d 853, 855,
856 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1972, no writ); Koonce v. City of Mesquite, 382 S.W.2d 309,
311 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1964, writ dism'd); Joachim v. Hamilton, 186 S.W. 251, 253 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Galveston 1916, writ dism'd).
149. E.g., Reagan v. Copeland, 78 Tex. 551, 556, 14 S.W. 1031, 1032 (1890); Crenshaw v.
Montague County, 228 S.W. 569, 570 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1920, no writ); Pruitt v.
Blesi, 204 S.W. 714, 715 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1918, writ ref'd); Smith v. Pecos Valley &
N.E. Ry., 95 S.W. 11, 12 (Tex. Civ. App. 1906, writ ref'd),
150. E.g., Waller v. O'Rear, 472 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); State v. Ripke, 426 S.W.2d 599, 604-05 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1968, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Strode v. Srygley, 342 S.W.2d 638, 641 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1961, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
151. Waller v. O'Rear, 472 S.W.2d 789, 791 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
152. Figari, Texas Civil Procedure, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 30 Sw. L.J. 293, 306
(1976).
153. Brown v. Brown, 520 S.W.2d 571, 576 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975,
writ dism'd w.o.j.); Parker v. Sabine Valley Lumber Co., 485 S.W.2d 853, 856 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1972, no writ); Harris v. Lebow, 363 S.W.2d 184, 185 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Johnson v. Brown, 218 S.W.2d 317, 321-22 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Hall v. Kynerd, 97 S.W.2d 278, 279 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1936, writ dism'd); see notes 148 supra, 160-70 infra and accompanying text.
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defendant cannot waive his right to a statement of facts in an unliquidated
damages situation. 154 In determining how this controversy should be re-
solved it is helpful to examine the statutory framework within which the
cases are decided and the reasoning used by those courts that have applied
the rule of Victory v. Hamilton in default judgment situations.
As amended, article 2324 directs the official court reporter, upon request,
to attend all sessions of court and take full shorthand notes of the cases tried
for the purpose of making a record. 5 5 The Family Code similarly provides
that a record shall be made of all civil cases unless waived by the parties
with the consent of the court. 56 In defining the record on appeal rule 371157
states that it shall consist of the transcript and "where necessary to the
appeal" a statement of facts. This statement of facts may take one of
several forms as rules 377 and 378158 expressly sanction narrative, ab-
breviated, and agreed statements of fact as alternatives to the standard
question-and-answer form.
Rules 377 and 378 have assumed additional importance since several
courts, in adopting the "due diligence" test, have held that a defaulting
defendant can waive his right to a statement of facts by failing to avail
himself of these rules. 5 9 Language from two of the leading cases is particu-
larly illuminating. In Brown v. Brown," ° a domestic relations case, defend-
ant complained that he was deprived of a statement of facts in question-
and-answer form. The Brown court properly rejected this argument because
plaintiff had procured a narrative statement of facts' 6' and stated that:
It reasonably follows that if the showing of unavailability of a ques-
tion-and-answer statement of facts does not show a ground for reversal
unless it is also shown that no statement is available from the alternative
sources, then the unavailability of a question-and-answer statement of
facts does not require reversal where there is available, and appellant is
furnished, a narrative statement certified by the trial judge. 1 '
Similarly, in an early breach of contract case a judgment by default was
entered "upon good and sufficient evidence.' 63 There was no stenographic
record of the evidence since a court reporter had not been requested. The
154. E.g., Woods v. Indiana Lumberman's Mut. Ins. Co., No. 1205 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi April 28, 1977); Hall v. C-F Employees Credit Union, 536 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1976, no writ); Morgan Express, Inc. v. Elizabeth-Perkins, Inc., 525
S.W.2d 312, 315 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd); Mitchell v. Hunsaker Mfg., Inc., 520
S.W.2d 796, 797 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ); Dugie v. Dugie, 511 S.W.2d 623, 624
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ).
155. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2324 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77).
156. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.14(d) (Vernon 1975).
157. TEX. R. Civ. P. 371.
158. TEX. R. Civ. P. 377, 378.
159. Smith v. Smith, 535 S.W.2d 380, 384 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976, writ granted);
Brown v. Brown, 520 S.W.2d 571, 576 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ
dism'd); Harris v. Lebow, 363 S.W.2d 184,185 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1962, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Johnson v. Brown, 218 S.W.2d 317, 321-22 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1948, writ ref'd n.r.e.);
Hall v. Kynerd, 97 S.W.2d 278, 279 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1936, writ dism'd).
160. 520 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd).
161. Id. at 576; accord, Crawford v. Crawford, 181 S.W.2d 992, 996 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1944, writ dism'd) (Norvell J., concurring).
162. 520 S.W.2d at 576.




defaulting defendant filed a motion praying that the court reporter be di-
rected to prepare a statement of facts. The trial court denied this motion
since such an order would have been futile. Defendant made no effort to
procure a statement of facts in an alternative form.IM On appeal defendant-
appellant contended that he was denied an adequate review because of the
absence of a statement of facts and argued that due to the absence of
reporter's notes a statement of facts in an alternative form could not have
been prepared. 165 In affirming, the court reasoned that:
The right to a reporter's transcript is a valuable right, but a statement of
facts made up independently of a reporter's transcript would serve
defendant's purposes. The only fact issue before the trial court was the
amount of damages which plaintiff had sustained; all other issues had
been determined by the default. The only questions which could be
raised here concerning the evidence heard by the trial court was
whether it was competent and whether it supported the trial court's
finding; and a narrative statement would present these questions as well
as a question and answer statement ....
• . . [T]he record does not show that the trial court's error was a
material error because it does not show that the defendant has been
deprived of a statement of facts which would present to this court the
questions he is entitled to raise. 166
A contrary line of authority holds that the right to a statement of facts on
appeal may not be waived by a failure to demonstrate the unavailability of a
statement of facts in an alternate form. 67 In the leading case of Morgan
Express, Inc. v. Elizabeth Perkins, Inc. 65 the Dallas court of civil appeals
held that a defendant who was not present when unliquidated damages were
proved was not required to seek a statement of facts in an alternate form
when the proceedings were not reported. In harmony with the minority view
of the "due diligence" test in nondefault situations, the Morgan Express
court concluded:
that an appellant who was not present and was not represented when
the testimony was taken is in no position to agree with his opponent
concerning the substance of the testimony, and neither should he be
required to rely on the unaided memory of the trial judge, who, though
presumably fair, has already decided the merits of the case against the
appellant. If the reporter's failure to perform this mandatory duty
deprives a party of this right to an adequate review, the case should be
remanded for a new trial.169
In Smith v. Smith 70 the Texas Supreme Court had the opportunity to
164. Id. at 320.
165. Id. at 320, 321.
166. Id. at 321-22 (citations omitted).
167. E.g., Hall v. C-F Employees Credit Union, 536 S.W.2d 266, 268 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Texarkana 1976, no writ); Morgan Express, Inc. v. Elizabeth-Perkins, Inc., 525 S.W.2d 312,
315 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd); Mitchell v. Hunsaker Mfg., Inc., 520 S.W.2d 796,
797 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1975, no writ); Dugie v. Dugie, 511 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ); James Edmond, Inc. v. Schilling, 501 S.W.2d 432, 434 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1973, no writ).
168. 525 S.W.2d 312, 315 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, writ ref'd).
169. Id. at 315 (citations omitted). Article 2324, as amended, provides that trials are to be
reported upon request. TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN, art. 2324 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77). Bledsoe v.
Black, 535 S.W.2d 795, 796 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ).
170. 535 S.W.2d 380 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont), rev'd, 544 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. 1976).
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clarify its holding in Victory v. Hamilton and approve or disapprove the
holding in Morgan Express. In this domestic relations case the defendant
husband answered but although notified failed to appear at the time of trial.
Evidence was heard and a judgment adverse to the husband was entered.
Defendant appealed by writ of error and sought a reversal because he had
been deprived of a statement of fact. In support of his position defendant
established that no record of the plaintiff's evidence was made and that the
trial judge had no independent recollection of the evidence and would not
attempt to prepare a statement of facts. The court of civil appeals held that
defendant's inability to obtain a statement of facts did not entitle him to a
new trial because the alleged error was not disclosed on the face of the
record. 171 In affirming the judgment of the trial court, the intermediate court
expressly refused to follow Morgan Express. The Supreme Court granted a
writ of error and reversed, holding that defendant had established, on the
face of the record, his right to a retrial because of his inability to procure a
statement of fact. 1
72
Subsequently, in Baen-Bec, Inc. v. Tenhoopen17 the Eastland court of
civil appeals addressed Morgan Express, Smith v. Smith, and the amended
article 2324. In Tenhoopen plaintiff's unliquidated damages evidence was
not reported. Defendant sought a reversal on this basis and also because
the trial court refused to grant him a new trial. The Tenhoopen court
reversed because the trial court had abused its discretion in refusing to set
the default judgment aside. Additionally, the Tenhoopen court rejected the
holding of Morgan Express, citing Smith v. Smith and the 1975 amendment
to article 2324.174
It is difficult to reconcile the holding of Tenhoopen with the Supreme
Court's decision in Smith v. Smith or the Eastland court of civil appeals
opinion in Wallace v. Snyder National Bank.175 Although Smith v. Smith did
not cite Morgan Express, it did cite with approval Wallace v. Snyder Nation-
al Bank and Dugie v. Dugie. 175" 1 Both Wallace v. Snyder National Bank and
Dugie v. Dugie are consistent with the holding of Morgan Express. Follow-
ing these precedents, the Supreme Court in Smith v. Smith held that the
petitioner had established his right to a new trial "because of his inability to
procure a statement of facts.'
75 2
In rejecting Morgan Express the Tenhoopen court relied heavily on an
amendment to article 2324. The court stated in part that, "[s]ubsequent to
Morgan Express, the Legislature amended Article 2324 by adding the words
'upon request.' If in fact the article was mandatory rather than directory
prior to the amendment, following the amendment, effective July 27, 1975,
article 2324 is no longer mandatory."175 .3 The court's reliance on the amend-
ment to article 2324 is questionable. First, the effective date of article 2324
171. 544 S.W.2d at 122.
172. Id. at 123.
173. No. 4996 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland March 10, 1977) (unreported).
174. Id. at 2.
175. 527 S.W.2d 485, 487-88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
175.1. 511 S.W.2d 623 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ),
175.2. 544 S.W.2d at 123.
175.3. No. 4996, at 3.
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was May 27, 1975, prior to the decision in Morgan Express and almost one
month before a rehearing was denied. Further, the bill to amend article 2324
was introduced at the request of the Texas Shorthand Reporters Association
to update the fee provision contained in the third paragraph of the stat-
ute, 175 4 harmonize the statute with the Family Code, and provide the Texas
Supreme Court with rulemaking authority. The requirement that each offi-
cial court reporter "shall" attend all sessions of the court was deleted
merely to conform to the practice of many courts of allowing the reporter to
attend to other matters unless specifically requested to report a proceeding.
The question of whether a defaulting defendant may waive his right to a
statement of facts on appeal is a source of continuing confusion to the bench
and the bar. The balancing of the competing interests is a delicate one. The
arguments in support of either position will not be detailed as they are best
left to the briefs and imaginative thinking of trial counsel. It is sufficient to
say that the competing interests are the encouragement of due diligence and
the principal of preserving for either litigant the right to a fair trial and an
adequate review. The authors recommend the approach taken by the Dallas
court of civil appeals in Morgan Express. The primary reason for adopting
this position is that it does not handicap the plaintiff's proof of unliquidated
damages, yet it establishes a rule which benefits the bench and the bar by its
ease in application. The authors recommend that this rule, with one excep-
tion, be applied uniformly in default judgment situations, even if the defend-
ant is guilty of conscious indifference in failing to appear when damages are
proven.' 76 The exception to this rule is that if a defendant does appear but
neglects to have the proceedings reported and fails to avail himself of rules
377 and 378, he should be deemed to have waived his right to a statement of
facts.' 77 Simply stated, a record should be made of plaintiff's proof of
unliquidated damages in all situations wherein the defendant is absent.
V. POST-JUDGMENT PROCEEDINGS
Once judgment by default is entered, several options are open to a
defendant if he wishes to attack the judgment. A final default judgment may
be set aside on motion for new trial or to set aside filed within thirty days. 78
The remedy of a regular appeal is available and a writ of error may be
prosecuted if filed within six months after the judgment was rendered. 179
Further, a bill of review may be filed within four years of entry of the
175.4. Conversation with John Newton, former state representative and co-sponsor of the
1975 amendment to article 2324. Conversation with Tommy Mullins, President of the Texas
Shorthand Reporters Association, May 17, 1977. Conversation with Tony Korioth, Counsel for
the Texas Shorthand Reporters Association, May 17, 1977.
176. See Smith v. Smith, 544 S.W.2d 121 (Tex. 1976). Contra, Brown v. Brown, 520 S.W.2d
571, 576 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1975, writ dism'd); Lickman v. Lickman, 368
S.W.2d 51, 54 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1963, writ dism'd).
177. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2324 (Vernon Supp. 1976-77); Bledsoe v. Black, 535
S.W.2d 795, 796 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1976, no writ); Phillips v. Phillips, 532 S.W.2d 161,
163 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1976, no writ). Contra, Strode v. Srygley, 342 S.W.2d 638, 640,
641 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
178. McEwen v. Harrison, 162 Tex. 125, 345 S.W.2d 706 (1961); Davis v. Thomas, No. 983(Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler March 10, 1977). Motion for a new trial in district court is governed by
TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b.
179. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 2255 (Vernon 1971).
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judgment by default. 8 ' Each of these alternatives will be discussed with
emphasis on what the defendant must demonstrate in order to obtain relief
from an adverse judgment. The final part of this section will discuss collater-
al attacks on judgments by default.
A. Setting Aside a Judgment by Default
A trial court's discretion in refusing to grant a new trial is not unbridled. In
Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc. 181 the commission of appeals stated
the test for setting aside default judgments as follows:
A default judgment should be set aside and a new trial ordered in any
case in which the failure of the defendant to answer before judgment
was not intentional, or the result of conscious indifference on his part,
but was due to a mistake or an accident; provided the motion for new
trial sets up a meritorious defense and is filed at a time when the
granting thereof will occasion no delay or otherwise work an injury to
the plaintiff.'8 2
When the judgment entered is not void,183 each of the enumerated Craddock
requirements must be met.' Since determination of whether a case meets
the Craddock test is left to the discretion of the trial court, the trial court's
ruling will not be overturned unless an abuse of discretion is shown. 85
To warrant the setting aside of a default judgment defendant must dem-
onstrate that his failure to timely answer was not intentional or the result of
conscious indifference but was instead due to an accident or mistake.
Negligence is no longer the test for such accident or mistake'8 6 despite
180. Id. art. 5529 (Vernon 1958); 4 R. McDONALD, supra note 5, § 18.27.6, at 330-31.
181. 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124 (1939).
182. Id. at 393, 133 S.W.2d at 126.
183. City of Fort Worth v. Gause, 129 Tex. 25, 28, 101 S.W.2d 221, 223 (1937); Hitt v. Bell,
III S.W.2d 1164, 1165 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1937, no writ); City of Corpus Christi v.
Scruggs, 89 S.W.2d 458, 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1935, no writ); I H. BLACK, supra
note 7, §§ 307, 355.
184. Glittenberg v. Hughes, 524 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no
writ); Messina v. Texas Bank & Trust Co., 496 S.W.2d 649, 651 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973,
no writ) (judgment affirmed where defendant declined to answer on the expectation that trial
court would not enter judgment for an alleged usurious interest charge on the promissory note
made a basis of the litigation); Lickman v. Lickman, 368 S.W.2d 51, 52 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1963, writ dism'd); Patton v. Samuel, 262 S.W.2d 439, 441 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1953, writ dism'd).
185. Compare Farley v. Clark Equip. Co., 484 S.W.2d 142, 150 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo
1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (trial court's action will not be set aside unless manifest abuse of
discretion is shown), and Young v. Snowcon, Inc., 463 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, no writ), with Hughes v. Jones, 543 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Tex. Civ.
App.-El Paso, no writ), and Western Union Tel. Co. v. McGinnis, 508 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ) (freely set aside). See generally Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co. v. Johnson, 389 S.W.2d 645, 648 (Tex. 1965); Jones v. Strayhorn, 159 Tex. 421, 428, 321
S.W.2d 290, 295 (1959).
186. E.g., Scrivner v. Malone, 30 Tex. 773, 775 (1868); Martin v. Ventura, 493 S.W.2d 336,
338 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, no writ); Young v. Snowcon, Inc., 463 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1971, no writ); Dempsey v. Gibson, 100 S.W.2d 430, 431 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Waco 1936, no writ); 4 R. McDONALD, supra note 5, § 18.10.2, at 268; see note 215
infra and accompanying text. When challenging a judgment by default in a bill of review
proceeding the judgment debtor must prove, among other things, that he was prevented from
asserting his defense by the wrongful act of his opponent, such act being unmixed with any fault
or negligence of the judgment debtor. Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 568-69, 226
S.W.2d 996, 998 (1950); 4 R. McDONALD, supra note 5, § 18.27.5, at 328. See note 299 infra and
accompanying text. A defendant's burden under Craddock "is much less onerous than the
burden that would have been placed on him had he allowed the time for new trial to expire and
sought relief in a bill of review proceeding." Ward v. Nava, 488 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex. 1972).
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contrary language in several cases.18 7 Indeed, the slightest excuse may be
sufficient to warrant setting aside a judgment by default so long as the act or
omission causing defendant's failure to answer was in fact accidental. 88
This rule is only fair since a defendant's burden of demonstrating the
accidental or mistaken nature of his failure to answer would generally result
in an admission of negligence.
Although this portion of the Craddock test has often played a major role
in the decided cases, no formula for distinguishing excusable accident or
mistake from intentional failure or conscious indifference has been stated.
The broad generalities emerging from the reported decisions have taken on a
variety of meanings in specific cases. For example, failure of a secretary to
notify an attorney of a trial setting, 8 9 or the misplacing of a file by an
attorney,' 90 secretary,' 9' or insurer' 92 have all been held to justify the setting
aside of a default judgment. Similarly, failure to forward process to one's
insurance company in advance of appearance day has been excused when
the papers were misplaced and forgotten. 93
Occasionally, ignorance of the law has also been held sufficient to excuse
a defendant's failure to answer.194 Mistakes of counsel are generally excus-
able, too, for miscalculating the answer date has been held a sufficient
excuse for failing to timely answer when coupled with other factors. 195
Similarly, an attorney's mistaken belief that the case would not be called
until a later date because of a crowded docket has prompted the granting of a
187. Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 213 (Tex. 1966); Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Carter,
499 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973, no writ); Farley v. Clark Equip. Co., 484
S.W.2d 142, 146 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
188. Beard v. McKinney, 456 S.W.2d 451, 453 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1970,
no writ); Cadena v. Dicker, 383 S.W.2d 73, 75 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1964, no writ). Gross
negligence is not an excuse since it rises to the level of conscious indifference. See Heath v.
Fraley, 50 Tex. 209, 211 (1878); National Mut. Cas. Co. v. Lambert, 149 S.W.2d 1086, 1089
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1941, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.).
189. Kirk v. Farmers Aerial Spraying Serv., Inc., 496 S.W.2d 739, 741 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1973, no writ).
190. Leonard v. Leonard, 512 S.W.2d 771, 773 (Tex. Civ. App.--Corpus Christi 1974, writ
dism'd).
191. Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Carter, 499 S.W.2d 673,674 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973,
no writ); Republic Bankers Life Ins. Co. v. Dixon, 469 S.W.2d 646,647 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler
1971, no writ).
192. Reynolds v. Looney, 389 S.W.2d 100, 101 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1965, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
193. Ward v. Nava, 488 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex. 1972).
194. Dowell v. Winters, 20 Tex. 793, 795 (1858); Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Carter, 499
S.W.2d 673, 674 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1973, no writ); Cadena v. Dicker, 383 S.W.2d 73, 75
(Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1964, no writ); Flusche v. Uselton, 201 S.W.2d 58, 59 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1947, no writ). But see Pierce v. Cole, 17 Tex. 259, 261 (1856); 1 H. BLACK, supra
note 7, § 335, at 512, § 341, at 524. One commentator has observed that the cases have generally
drawn no distinction between mistakes of law and mistakes of fact. Annot., 21 A.L.R.3d 1255,
1262 (1968).
195. Continental Airlines, Inc. v. Carter, 499 S.W.2d 673, 675 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso
1973, no writ); Texas Iron & Metal Co. v. Utility Supply Co., 493 S.W.2d 545, 546 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Allison v. American Sur. Co., 248 S.W. 829,
832 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1923, no writ); see Hickman v. Swain, 210 S.W. 548, 551-52
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1919, no writ) (error to reinstate case after dismissal for want of
prosecution when plaintiff's counsel miscalculated date upon which court would convene);
Springer v. Gillespie, 56 S.W. 369, 370 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900, no writ). See generally Annot., 21
A.L.R.3d 1255 (1968) (opening judgment claimed to have been obtained because of attorney
mistake as to time or place of appearance, trial, or filing of necessary papers); I H. BLACK,
supra note 7, § 341 (general discussion of attorney negligence).
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new trial. 196 The same was true when counsel thought his request for a
continuance had been granted when in fact it had been lost in the mails. 197
Furthermore, counsel's mistaken mailing of defendant's plea of privilege to
the wrong county seat was excusable even when the defendant's plea was
not received by the clerk until after a judgment by default had been entered
because counsel had previously mailed to the same town other papers which
had been received by the proper clerk.19 8
Excusable accidents or mistakes sometimes occur from the acts of others
or of providence. For example, defendant's failure to answer is excusable if
it resulted from reliance upon certain acts or statements of the plaintiff,199 as
a result of opposing counsel's fraudulent intent to take unfair advantage of
the defendant 2°° or his failure to notify defendant of the trial setting. 201
Similarly, a new trial should be granted where the clerk failed to notify a
nonresident attorney of a trial setting after having been requested to do so. 202
A motion for new trial should also be granted on a showing that the suit had
apparently been settled prior to the entry of judgment. 20 3 An unexpected
transportation failure2°4 or counsel's failure to timely appear at the time of
trial after getting lost on country roads has also been held to constitute a
sufficient excuse to warrant a new trial.20 5
Just as the absence of the defendant or his attorney due to illness 2°6 or
compulsory attendance in another court207 ordinarily compels the granting of
196. Scottish Union & Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Tomkies, 66 S.W. 1109, 1110 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902,
no writ).
197. Yellow Transit Co. v. Klaff, 145 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1940, no
writ).
198. Borger v. Mineral Wells Clay Prods. Co., 80 S.W.2d 333, 337 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Eastland 1935, no writ).
199. Field & Co. v. Fowler, 62 Tex. 65, 69 (1884); Interstate Minerals, Inc. v. Schlumberger
Well Surveying Corp., 219 S.W.2d 604, 605 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1949, no writ); Metropoli-
tan Cas. Ins. Co. v. City of Junction, 55 S.W.2d 655, 656 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1932,
no writ); Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Arant, 40 S.W. 853 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, no writ). To be
enforceable an agreement must be made in open court and entered of record or signed by the
parties thereto and filed among the papers of the case. TEX. R. Civ. P. 11; 1 H. BLACK, supra
note 7, § 322, at 495.
200. See Pearl Assur. Co. v. Williams, 167 S.W.2d 808, 812 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1942, no writ) (appeal from judgment sustaining special exceptions to a bill of review petition);
Meckel v. State Bank, 256 S.W. 668, 669 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1923, no writ).
201. Torres v. Casso-Guerra & Co., 512 S.W.2d 777, 780 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
202. Brown v. General Elec. Co., 402 S.W.2d 957, 958-59 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1966, writ dism'd); Vela v. Sharp, 395 S.W.2d 66, 67 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1965, writ
ref'd n.r.e.) (failure of clerk to comply with TEX. R. Civ. P. 246).
203. Sedberry v. Jones, 42 Tex. 10, 11-12 (1875); Chancy v. Allen, 25 S.W.2d 1115, 1116
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1930, no writ). But see Ladd v. Coleman, 285 S.W. 1096, 1098, 1099
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1926, no writ); Southwestern Sur. Ins. Co. v. Gulf, T. & W. Ry.,
196 S.W. 276, 278 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1917, writ ref'd).
204. Thomas v. Womack, 13 Tex. 580, 585-86 (1855) (defendant delayed by the illness of his
horse); Pecos & N.T. Ry. v. Faulkner, 118 S.W. 747,749 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, no writ) (change
in train schedule).
205. Presidio Cotton Gin & Oil Co. v. Duprey, 2 S.W.2d 341, 342-43 (Tex. Civ. App.-El
Paso 1928, no writ) ("Owing to the numerous country roads which lead from one watering place
to another without going to any place in particular" counsel was one hour late for trial, by
which time judgment had been entered).
206. Goodhue v. J. Meyers & Co., 58 Tex. 405, 406 (1883); Berhns v. Harris, 150 S.W. 495
(Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1912, no writ); Southwestern Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Jennings, 51 S.W.
288, 289 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, no writ); Holliman v. Pearlstone, 29 S.W. 542 (Tex. Civ. App.
1895, no writ).
207. Tullis v. Scott, 38 Tex. 537, 541-42 (1873); Farmers' Gas Co. v. Calame, 262 S.W. 546,
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a new trial, an illness in the family of the defendant's attorney may be a
sufficient excuse for failing to answer. °0 The court may, however, require
that he was deprived of representation by such illness and that he used due
diligence in seeking the employment of other counsel.2" Illness of the
defendant, however, has been held not to excuse his failing to answer where
he either had an active business manager who could have answered, 10 or
had sufficient time to answer but simply failed to take the necessary steps. 23 '
There are, however, limits to excusable accidental mistakes. Courts have
held that the actions of one's counsel excuse a defendant's failure to answer
only when they rise to the level of deceit or betrayal. 21 2 A defendant's
mistake in thinking that an attorney had been retained to represent him in a
cause may not excuse a failure to timely answer. 2 3 A failure to answer
through confusion in counsel's office has been held not to require the
granting of a new trial.2" 4 Negligence of defendant's attorney in failing to file
an answer has been held to be an insufficient excuse for failing to answer. 21 5
Similarly, a refusal to answer on the mistaken belief that the litigation is
stayed by either a prior pleading, 2 6 a proceeding in another forum, 217 or an
549-50 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1924, no writ). But see Murray v. Dahlem, 524 S.W.2d 409, 410
(Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, no writ).
208. Walker v. Harris, 227 S.W. 360, 361 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1921, no writ);
Howard v. Emerson, 59 S.W. 49, 50 (Tex. Civ. App. 1900, no writ).
209. Southwestern Sur. Ins. Co. v. Gulf, T. & W. Ry., 196 S.W. 276, 278 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1917, writ ref'd); see Homuth v. Williams, 42 S.W.2d 1048, 1049 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1931, no writ).
210. Woytek v. King, 218 S.W. 1081, 1081-82 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1920, no writ).
211. Heath v. Fraley, 50 Tex. 209, 211 (1878).
212. Caldwell Oil Co. v. Hickman, 270 S.W. 214, 218 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1925, no
writ); see Sandoval v. Rattikin, 395 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1965, writ
ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 901 (1966). See generally 1 H. BLACK, supra note 7, § 344
(fraud of attorney).
213. Brothers Dept. Store, Inc. v. Berenzweig, 333 S.W.2d 445, 447 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1960, no writ); Dempsey v. Gibson, 100 S.W.2d 430, 432 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1936,
no writ).
214. See St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Earnest, 293 S.W. 677, 681 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo), aff'd, 116 Tex. 565, 296 S.W. 1088 (1927); Western Union Tel. Co. v.
Skinner, 128 S.W. 715, 717 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ ref'd). Contra, Beard v. McKinney, 456
S.W.2d 451, 454 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [Ist Dist.] 1970, no writ) (abuse of discretion to
refuse new trial when default resulted from a "breakdown of procedure in appellant's attor-
ney's office").
215. Scrivner v. Malone, 30 Tex. 773, 775 (1868); Tarrant County v. Lively, 25 Tex. 399
(1860); Justice Life Ins. Co. v. Walker, 508 S.W.2d 434, 436-37 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Allais v. Lynch, 489 S.W.2d 342, 344 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Brothers Dept. Store, Inc. v. Berenzweig, 333 S.W.2d 445, 447
(Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Briggs v. Ladd, 64 S.W.2d 389, 390 (Tex.
Civ. App.-San Antonio 1933, no writ); Homuth v. Williams, 42 S.W.2d 1048, 1049 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1931, no writ); Shipp v. Anderson, 173 S.W. 598, 599 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Galveston 1915, no writ); Wilson v. Smith, 43 S.W. 1086, 1089 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, writ
dism'd). An attorney's actions are binding on his client. Gracey v. West, 422 S.W.2d 913, 918
(Tex. 1968); Swearingen v. Swearingen, 487 S.W.2d 784, 787 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1972, writ dism'd); Sandoval v. Rattikin, 395 S.W.2d 889, 893 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1965, writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 901 (1966). In these situations a defendant's
recourse is against his attorney. Scrivner v. Malone, 30 Tex. 773, 775 (1868).
216. Ladd v. Coleman, 285 S.W. 1096, 1099 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1926, no writ).
217. Graham v. San Antonio Mach. & Supply Corp., 418 S.W.2d 303, 307 (Tex. Civ.
App.-San Antonio 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Simpson v. Glenn, 103 S.W.2d 433, 434 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1937, no writ); Dempsey v. Gibson, 100 S.W.2d 430,432 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco
1936, no writ); Don Love, Inc. v. Good Hope Refineries, Inc., Civ. No. 1,023,569 (Dist. Ct. of




agreement with opposing counsel2 18 does not constitute a sufficient basis for
failing to answer. Indeed, a failure to answer while filing a plea to add an
additional party, accompanied by reliance on a custom that no judgment
would be entered until the plea was disposed of, does not constitute a
legitimate excuse for failing to answer.2 19
A court is not compelled to accept every excuse made prior to appearance
day even if the excuse is otherwise valid. For instance, a defendant's failure
to appear because of conflicting business commitments is inexcusable.22 °
Further, it is not error to deny a new trial in a case where counsel deliberate-
ly refused to attend trial and his clients had secreted themselves.22 ' A failure
to appear at the time of trial on the mistaken belief that the case would be
passed after counsel had informed the clerk of a conflicting engagement is
an insufficient basis for setting aside a judgment by default unless counsel
had made an attempt to obtain a continuance. 222 Moreover, an unexplained
delay by a nonresident in obtaining Texas counsel constituted conscious
indifference even though the defendant had written the judge asking for
additional time to hire a Texas attorney. 223
A decision with respect to granting or denying a new trial is reviewable
only for abuse of discretion. 224 Denial of a motion for new trial is not an
abuse of discretion when defendant has been advised on more than one
occasion by opposing counsel that he was in default by virtue of his failure
to answer and had received actual notice of the trial setting. 225 The same is
true when defendant, unrepresented by counsel, is admonished by the court
to obtain counsel and fails to do so. 226 Further, the mere fact that negotia-
tions and relations between the parties have been friendly does not justify
the defendant's belief that plaintiff would not take a default judgment; his
failure to answer on that basis is not sufficient to require the granting of a
new trial. 227
In the foregoing cases, the courts have been more concerned with results
than with theories. This has precipitated a long series of inconsistent opin-
ions predicated not upon fixed principles, but upon a subjective determina-
tion of what is best in a particular case. If the accident or mistake require-
218. O'Brien v. Cole, 532 S.W.2d 151, 153 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1976, no writ); Padgitt v.
Evans, 51 S.W. 513, 514 (Tex. Civ. App. 1899, no writ).
219. Gillaspie v. City of Huntsville, 151 S.W. 1114, 1116 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1912,
no writ).
220. Landa v. McGehee, 19 S.W. 516, 516 (Tex. 1892) (defendant had "no one to look after
his business or attend to his stock").
221. Strode v. Silverman, 217 S.W.2d 454, 456 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1949, writ ref'd).
222. Murray v. Dahlem, 524 S.W.2d 409, 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1975, no writ).
223. Vinson v. Triangle Ranch, Inc., 472 S.W.2d 793, 794 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1971,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); accord, Union Cent. Life Ins. Co. v. Lipscomb, 27 S.W. 307, 308 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1894, no writ).
224. Western Union Tel. Co. v. McGinnis, 508 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tex. Civ. App.-San
Antonio 1974, no writ); Boatright v. Peterson, 490 S.W.2d 240, 242 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin
1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Farley v. Clark Equip. Co., 484 S.W.2d 142, 150 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
225. Ana-Log, Inc. v. City of Tyler, 520 S.W.2d 819, 822 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
226. Wood v. Zenith Mortgage Co., 538 S.W.2d 446, 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1976,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bratcher v. Sherman, 474 S.W.2d 807, 808-09 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971,
no writ).




ment of the Craddock test is to have substance, trial courts should refuse to
set aside default judgments unless convinced that the defaulting defendant
has acted in good faith and that the accident or mistake by which he seeks to
excuse himself was the cause of his default and that notwithstanding its
existence, he could not have protected himself by the exercise of reasonable
diligence.2 28 The fact of defendant's good faith and the accidental nature of
his failure to answer must be demonstrated by affidavit or other competent
evidence.229
According to Craddock, a default judgment will be set aside only if
defendant is able to "set up" a meritorious defense. 230 A meritorious de-
fense is one which if proved would cause a different result upon a retrial of
the case. 23 In setting up a meritorious defense, the defendant must allege
facts232 which in law constitute a defense to the cause of action pleaded.2 33
The fact of a meritorious defense must be prima facie established by af-
fidavit or other competent evidence.234 Although the fact of a meritorious
defense may not be refuted, 235 the legal sufficiency of the facts will be
carefully scrutinized. 2 6 In general, this means that a defendant must dis-
close his defense with sufficient particularity to enable the court to deter-
mine whether it is good and sufficient on the merits. 237 If a defendant is
without a meritorious defense, the setting aside of the judgment would be a
vain act and a waste of the court's time.
When examining the sufficiency of a meritorious defense, the trial court
may judge the veracity of defendant's evidence;238 but neither defendant's
answer nor his motion to set aside are proper default judgment evidence. 239
228. I A. FREEMAN, supra note 7, § 242, at 481.
229. See notes 238-41 infra and accompanying text.
230. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 393, 133 S.W.2d 124, 126 (1939).
231. Holliday v. Holliday, 72 Tex. 581, 585, 10 S.W. 690, 692 (1889); Cragin v. Henderson
County Oil Dev. Co., 280 S.W. 554, 555 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1926, holding approved); Yellow
Transit Co. v. Klaff, 145 S.W.2d 264, 266 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1940, no writ); Sanns v.
Chapman, 144 S.W.2d 341, 342 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1940, writ dism'd jdgmt cor.). Black
defines a meritorious defense as one that is "substantial and not merely technical, fair and
honest and not unconscionable." I H. BLACK, supra note 7, § 348, at 540.
232. Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. 1966); El Paso & S.W. Ry. v. Kelley, 99 Tex.
87, 92, 87 S.W. 660, 662-63 (1905); Pierson v. McClanahan, 531 S.W.2d 672, 676 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Bredeson v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
513 S.W.2d 110, 113 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1974, no writ); Patton v. Samuel, 262 S.W.2d 439,
441 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1953, writ dism'd).
233. Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. 1966); Southwest Plaza Apartments, Inc. v.
Corpus Christi Brick & Lumber Co., 528 S.W.2d 885, 888 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi
1975, no writ). Two commentators have catalogued a variety of defenses the meritoriousness of
which have been adjudicated. I H. BLACK, supra note 7, § 349; 49 C.J.S. Judgments § 336(c), at
648 (1947).
234. Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. 1966); Hatton v. Gonzalez, 541 S.W.2d 197,
199 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no writ); Farley v. Clark Equip. Co., 484 S.W.2d
142, 147 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Empire Life & Hosp. Ins. Co. v.
Poole, 469 S.W.2d 644, 645 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1971, no writ) (affidavit of counsel
insufficient).
235. Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. 1966).
236. Russell v. Northeast Bank, 527 S.W.2d 783, 786-87 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [lst
Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Farley v. Clark Equip. Co., 484 S.W.2d 142, 147-50 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Amarillo 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
237. 1 A. FREEMAN, supra note 7, § 283, at 560; accord, Foster v. Martin, 20 Tex. 118, 122
(1857).
238. Ward v. Nava, 488 S.W.2d 736, 740 (Tex. 1972) (Reavley, J., dissenting); General
Portland, Inc. v, Collins, No. 17813 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth March 25, 1977) (Massey, J.,
dissenting); Young v. Snowcon, Inc., 463 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1971, no writ).
239. 1 H. BLACK, supra note 7, § 347, at 538; see, e.g., Hidalgo v. Surety Sav. & Loan
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Affidavits in support of defendant's motion must be based on personal
knowledge and so worded as to be admissible if the facts stated were given
on the witness stand. 4 ° If affidavit testimony is from an interested witness,
it should be clear, direct, and positive.24 '
Craddock also requires that before a judgment by default may be set
aside, it must be established that defendant's motion was filed at a time
when the granting thereof would occasion no delay or otherwise injure
plaintiff.2 42 Under Craddock a defaulting defendant cannot procrastinate
during the thirty-day period in which a trial court retains the power to set
aside a final default judgment. 24 3 He must demonstrate his good faith by
promptly taking affirmative action as soon as he learns of the judgment.
Once a defendant has introduced evidence that his motion has not been filed
at a time when granting the motion would delay or otherwise injure plaintiff,
the burden of persuasion is the plaintiff's; and plaintiff's motion must state
the facts of any delay or other injury with particularity. 2"
There is no precise formula for determining when the filing of a motion to
set aside will occasion delay. The decision in one case with respect to a
particular period of time will not necessarily govern another case involving a
similar period. Additionally, the length of the delay is not determinative. In
one case the court held that a three-day delay amounted to conscious
indifference and would delay or otherwise work an injury to the plaintiff. 245
In other cases the same was true of delays amounting to eleven days,246
nineteen days, 247 and three weeks. 24 Conversely, in one case the court
specifically observed that a seven-day delay would occasion no "signifi-
cant" delay or otherwise injure plaintiff. 249 These cases demonstrate that
any unexplained delay in the filing of a motion to set aside after knowledge
of the facts will always be taken into consideration in harmony with the
equitable doctrine of laches; such delay may be sufficient to defeat relief
Ass'n, 462 S.W.2d 540, 542 (Tex. 1971); Brothers Dep't Store, Inc. v. Berenzweig, 333 S.W.2d
445, 448 (Tex. Civ. App.-1960, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Odom v. Pinkston, 193 S.W.2d 888, 891 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1946, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Contra, Miller v. First State Bank & Trust Co., 184
S.W. 614, 619 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1915, no writ); Gillaspie v. City of Huntsville, 151 S.W.
1114, 1116 (Tex. Civ. App-Galveston 1912, no writ).
240. See Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 215 (Tex. 1966); Allais v. Lynch, 489 S.W.2d 342,
345 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Executive Press, Inc. v. Oak
Cliff Mirror & Glass Co., 478 S.W.2d 642, 643 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1972, no writ); I H.
BLACK, supra note 7, § 347, at 538. See also Crain v. Davis, 417 S.W.2d 53, 55 (Tex. 1967);
Tobin v. Garcia, 159 Tex. 58, 316 S.W.2d 396 (Tex. 1958).
241. Pugh v. Texas Co., 437 S.W.2d 55, 57 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1969, no writ); see
Haskins v. Finks, 470 S.W.2d 717, 718 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). See
also Gulf Collateral, Inc. v. Cauble, 462 S.W.2d 619,623 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1971, no
writ); I H. BLACK, supra note 7, § 351.
242. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124 (1939).
243. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b(5). See generally Bronson v. Schulten, 104 U.S. 410 (1881).
244. Ward v. Nava, 488 S.W.2d 736, 738 (Tex. 1972); Western Union Tel. Co. v. McGinnis,
508 S.W.2d 147, 150 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1974, no writ).245. Grammar v. Hobby, 276 S.W.2d 311, 313 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1955, writ
ref'd n.r.e.). For an informative discussion of the due diligence requirement see I H. BLACK,
supra note 7, § 313.
246. Glittenberg v. Hughes, 524 S.W.2d 954, 956 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1975, no
writ).
247. Griffin v. Duty, 286 S.W.2d 229, 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1956, no writ).
248. Simpson v. Glenn, 103 S.W.2d 433, 434 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1937, no writ).
249. Abercia v. First Nat'l Bank, 500 S.W.2d 573, 577 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1973,
no writ); see Torres v. Casso-Guerra & Co., 512 S.W.2d 777,781 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio
1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
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from a default judgment even though the statutory period for setting aside
such a judgment25 ° has not elapsed.
The cases which have focused on the delay element of the Craddock test
have also expressed concern when the granting of a new trial would signifi-
cantly prolong resolution of the controversy between the parties. In one
case the court emphasized that the granting of defendant's motion would
result in the passage of docket assignments to the point where trial could not
be had for at least six months. 25' Changes in a defendant's ability to respond
in damages may also be a relevant consideration. For example, in one case
the court noted that the delay encountered would not prejudice plaintiff
because no other judgments had been taken against defendant during the
interim period. 252
To prevent injury to plaintiff, the defaulting defendant may be required to
pay plaintiff's costs, including attorney's fees. In 1854 the supreme court
affirmed the award of costs as a term upon which a motion for new trial
could be granted. 253 In that opinion the supreme court had occasion to note
that the granting of new trials upon the payment of costs was "constant
practice.1 25 4 Recently, the supreme court discussed the mechanics of as-
sessing costs in a default situation. 255 The factors suggested for considera-
tion were loss of earnings caused by trial attendance, expenses of witnesses,
and any other expenses of plaintiff attributable to defendant's default. 256
The court emphasized that after considering these factors, the trial court
should then exercise its discretion to make an equitable determination con-
sistent with the facts of each case. 257
This last element of the Craddock test allows the trial court great discre-
tion in balancing the equities of a particular case. Obviously, a plaintiff who
has obtained a final default judgment can demonstrate some delay or other
injury if a new trial is granted. This showing, however, should not be the
proper criterion for setting aside a default judgment because if it were, the
defaulting defendant would be presented with a virtually insurmountable
burden. In each case where a new trial is granted some delay or other injury
will be encountered; it is the court's responsibility through the judicious use
250. See notes 176-80 supra and accompanying text.
251. Griffin v. Duty, 286 S.W.2d 229, 233 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1956, no writ);
accord, Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 133 S.W.2d 124 (1939); National
Mut. Cas. Co. v. Lambert, 149 S.W.2d 1086, 1090 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1941, writ
dism'd jdgmt cor.). The matter of passing docket assignments is of greater concern in less
populous counties where the docket is not congested and where the district judge may still ride
the circuit.
252. Kirk v. Farmers Aerial Spraying Serv., Inc., 496 S.W.2d 739, 743 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Amarillo 1973, no writ).
253. Houston v. Starr, 12 Tex. 424 (1854). Similarly, one commentator stated: "In the case
of a motion to vacate or open a default judgment, payment of reasonable attorney's fees by the
defaulting party to the party in whose favor the default judgment was rendered has been
unanimously held to be a proper condition." Annot., 21 A.L.R. 2d 863, 865 (1952); accord, I H.
BLACK, supra note 7, § 352, at 550.
254. Houston v. Starr, 12 Tex. 424, 426 (1854).
255. United Beef Producers, Inc. v. Lookingbill, 532 S.W.2d 958, 959 (Tex. 1976); accord,
Crabbe v. Hord, 536 S.W.2d 409, 414 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
256. United Beef Producers, Inc. v. Lookingbill, 532 S.W.2d 958, 959 (Tex. 1976). Many of
these factors have applicability only in an unliquidated damages situation. See notes 137-42
supra and accompanying text.
257. United Beef Producers, Inc. v. Lookingbill, 532 S.W.2d 958, 959 (Tex. 1976).
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of assessing costs to cure these problems. The courts should require that the
defaulting defendant demonstrate that he has acted in a timely manner to
prevent injury to plaintiff and others who have relied on the judgment.
B. Setting Aside Default Judgments on Such Terms
as the Court Shall Direct
Rule 320258 provides that new trials may be granted on such "terms" as
the court shall direct. From 1846 to 1925 the predecessors of rule 320
provided that new trials could be granted on such "terms and conditions" as
the court directed.25 9 Although similar language has been used for over one
hundred years, there is a paucity of recorded precedent regarding the
"terms and conditions" upon which default judgments may be set aside and
new trials granted. This is mainly because of early decisions holding that the
granting of a motion for new trial must be absolute and unconditional. That
rule was established by the Texas Supreme Court in Secrest v. Best 26° in
which case a motion for new trial was granted on the condition precedent261
that defendants pay court costs before the first day of the next term.
Defendants did not pay the court costs, and the conditional order granting
the new trial was set aside. Thereupon defendants paid all court costs as
previously ordered, and a new trial was allowed. At the second trial defend-
ants prevailed and plaintiff appealed, contending that the order conditionally
setting aside the judgment for plaintiff was a nullity. The supreme court
agreed and held that an order granting a motion for new trial must be
absolute and unconditional. 262 Holding that all proceedings subsequent to
the first judgment were null and void, the court reinstated the judgment for
plaintiff. 263
In 1890 the supreme court had occasion to review the rule of Secrest v.
Best in Fenn v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry.264 The order granting a new trial in that
case decreed that as a condition for a new trial defendant was to pay the
expenses of those witnesses who had testified. Plaintiffs challenged this
order as a nullity under the rule of Secrest v. Best. Defining and limiting
Secrest v. Best, the court held that the payment of witness expenses was a
258. TEX. R. Civ. P. 320.
259. Tex. Laws 1846, An Act to Regulate Proceedings in the District Courts art. 1755, § 109,
at 363, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1698 (1898); 1 G. PASCHAL. LAWS OF TEXAS art. 1470, at
362 (1873); 1 J. SAYLES & H. SAYLES, SAYLES' TEXAS CIVIL STATUTES art. 1368, at 454 (1889).
260. 6 Tex. 199 (1851) (the court emphasized that case was one involving conditional
payment of cost after expiration of trial court's power over judgment). The predecessor of TEX.
R. Civ. P. 320 in effect at that time provided that "[n]ew trials may be granted in all civil cases,
on such terms and conditions as the court may direct." Tex. Laws 1846, An Act to Regulate
Proceedings in the District Courts art. 1755, § 109, at 363, 2 H. GAMMEL, LAWS OF TEXAS 1698
(1898).
261. For a discussion of conditions precedent and subsequent see L. SIMPSON, LAW OF
CONTRACTS §§ 144-45 (1965); 5 S. WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 666A,
667 (W. Jaeger rev. ed. 1961).
262. Secrest v. Best, 6 Tex. 199, 201 (1851).
263. Id. Later decisions have applied the rule of Secrest in default judgment situations. See,
e.g., City of San Antonio v. Dickman, 34 Tex. 647, 650 (1871); Hargrave v. Boero, 23 S.W. 403,
403-04 (Tex. Civ. App. 1893, no writ).
264. 76 Tex. 380, 13 S.W. 273 (1890). The predecessor of TEX. R. CIv. P. 320 enacted shortly
before this decision provided that "[n]ew trials may be granted, and judgments may be set aside
or arrested, on motion, for good cause, on such terms and conditions as the court shall direct."
76 Tex. at 382, 13 S.W. at 273-74; 1 J. SAYLES & H. SAYLES, supra note 259, art. 1368, at 454.
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"term" upon which the order was entered rather than a condition precedent
and, therefore, valid. 265
Ten years later, in Town v. Guerguin,266 the supreme court again limited
the broad holding of Secrest v. Best. There the court observed: "It has been
held generally that a court may grant a motion for new trial upon a condition
to be performed thereafter, and, in case the condition is not performed, the
judgment which had been vacated will be restored. ' 267 Finally, in 1925 the
legislature deleted the word "conditions. ' ' 268 Present rule 320 continues in
the same vein by providing that default judgments may be set aside on such
"terms" as the court directs, 269 although it does not specify the "terms"
upon which a judgment may be set aside. One leading commentator has,
however, prepared the following sampling of the terms at a trial court's
disposal:
In a proper case, in the exercise of its discretion the court may require
the defendant to submit himself to the jurisdiction of the court, to
consent to go to trial at a particular time, or to consent to the appoint-
ment of a receiver, or to stipulate not to bring an action against parties
who acted under the judgment, or to forego a change of venue, or to pay
all expenses in a reasonable amount and all costs accrued up to the date
of its vacation, including a reasonable attorney's fee, or to deposit
money in court to pay so much of the claims sued upon as he admits to
be due. 27
0
The balancing of competing equitable interests in a default situation is a
compelling reason why the trial court should be vested with considerable
discretion in specifying the terms upon which a default judgment will be set
aside. The imposition of certain terms may be necessary to insure that the
setting aside of a judgment by default will not delay or otherwise work an
injury to plaintiff. 27' If the defaulting defendant should fail to abide by the
terms of the court's order, the court should exercise its inherent power and
sanction the recalcitrant defendant rather than summarily reinstate the
former judgment. As the terms and sanctions which could properly be
imposed are many, their imposition should vary according to the facts of
each case. This way, the merits of a case are likely to be reached yet the
litigants are afforded ample protection against a trial court's abuse of discre-
tion since the trial court's action would be subject to review.
C. Regular Appeal
Regular appeal to the court of civil appeals is as available to a party who
has suffered judgment by default as it is to a party who appeared and
participated in the litigation. The timetable and mechanics in the default
judgment situation are no different from those for any other regular appeal.
Regular appeal is not, however, immediately available to attack the trial
265. Fenn v. Gulf, C. & S.F. Ry., 76 Tex. 380, 382, 13 S.W. 273, 274 (1890).
266. 93 Tex. 608, 57 S.W. 565 (1900).
267. Id.
268. Tex. Laws 1925, ch. 10, at 597.
269. TEX. R. Civ. P. 320.
270. 1 A. FREEMAN, supra note 7, § 295, at 584-85; accord, I H. BLACK, supra note 7, § 352.
271. Craddock v. Sunshine Bus Lines, Inc., 134 Tex. 388, 391-92, 133 S.W.2d 124, 126
(1939); see notes 242-57 supra and accompanying text.
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court's order setting aside a judgment by default since that order is inter-
locutory.27 2 Further, the weight of authority holds that orders setting aside
judgments by default may not be reviewed even after completion of the
second trial.273 As a result, the trial court's action is subject to immediate
review only if it fails to set aside a judgment by default.
The obvious policy reason behind this procedural anomaly is to have
lawsuits decided on their merits, and once decided to disregard the initial
default. The various competing policy considerations were stated in an early
supreme court decision:
Great injustice, however, may be done by 'lending too easy an ear' to
applications for new trials. A party whose cause is just may be thus
delayed in its prosecution until his witnesses are dead, his evidence lost
or destroyed, and his rights ultimately defeated, or if successful in the
end, even success may not compensate for the harassment, vexation,
and expense of causelessly protracted litigation. But the law does not
proceed upon the supposition that the power intrusted to its ministers
will be abused. Its general rules do not contemplate extreme cases. Nor
are such the legitimate or natural consequences of the discretion with
which the courts are invested in granting new trials. And although in the
exercise of that discretion injustice may sometimes be done, there is
still this material and obvious distinction between the improper refusal
and granting of a new trial. In the one case the injury is irreparable
unless by a revising tribunal; in the other it ordinarily is not so, for
another opportunity of obtaining justice is afforded.
But unless the granting of new trials is subject to a revising power it is
not easy to perceive what effectual limitation there is upon the discre-
tion of the judge, or how it can justly be said to be a legal as distin-
guished from that arbitrary discretion which has been characterized, in
the extremely forcible language of Lord Camden, as 'the law of tyrants;
always unknown; different in different men; casual; depending upon
constitution, temper, passion.' 274
272. Warren v. Walter, 409 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1967, writ ref'd n.r.e.). A
leading commentator has stated the policy behind disallowing appeals from interlocutory orders
as the following:
The policy of the laws of the several states and of the United States is to prevent
unnecessary appeals. The appellate courts will not review cases by piecemeal.
The interests of litigants require that causes should not be prematurely brought
to the higher courts. The errors complained of might be corrected in the court in
which they originated; or the party injured by them might, notwithstanding the
injury, have final judgment in his favor. If a judgment, interlocutory in its
nature, were the subject of appeal, each of such judgments rendered in the case
could be brought before the appellate court, and litigants harassed by useless
delay and expense and the courts burdened with unnecessary labor.
1 A. FREEMAN, supra note 7, § 44, at 70.
273. E.g., Warren v. Walter, 409 S.W.2d 887 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1966, writ ref'd
n.r.e.); Flato Bros. v. McKinney, 399 S.W.2d 957 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1966, no
writ); Stocks v. Baptist Gen. Convention, 362 S.W.2d 1%, 198 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1962, no writ); Silva v. Sentinel Life Ins. Co., 361 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1962,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Annot., 8 A.L.R.3d 1272, § 3 (1966); see Ebaugh v. State, 342 S.W.2d 221, 223(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y v. Murdock, 219
S.W.2d 159, 164 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1949, writ ref'd n.r.e.). But see Secrest v. Best, 6
Tex. 199, 200 (1851); Hughes v. Madox, 6 Tex. 90 (1851); Sweeney v. Jarvis, 6 Tex. 36, 39(1851); City of Wichita Falls v. Dye, 517 S.W.2d 680, 681 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1974,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Rector v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 506 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Davis v. Howard, 436 S.W.2d 225, 227-28
(Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1968, no writ); Flusche v. Uselton, 201 S.W.2d 58, 59 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Austin 1947, no writ); Atkinson v. Leonard, 287 S.W..525 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1926, no writ); Allison v. American Sur. Co., 248 S.W. 829, 832 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston
1923, no writ); TEX. R. Civ. P. 325.
274. Sweeny v. Jarvis, 6 Tex. 36, 39-40 (1851).
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To insure fairness in the application of the Craddock test, the trial court's
discretion in setting aside the earlier judgment by default should be subject
to review after a final judgment on the merits.
D. Appeal by Writ of Error
The appellate jurisdiction of the court of civil appeals and the supreme
court may be invoked by a writ of error.27 5 The writ, like an appeal,
constitutes a direct attack on a void or erroneous judgment,2 76 but a writ of
error is only available to a party that did not participate in the trial either in
person or through his attorney.2 77 Accordingly, appeal by writ of error is
jurisdictionally unavailable to those who participated in some manner in the
trial of the case. 27
8
The error complained of in an appeal by writ of error must be disclosed on
the face of the record. 279 Accordingly, the fundamental question in a writ of
error appeal is whether there was an error apparent on the face of the record
that would vitiate the trial court's judgment. 2 ° The same reviewing stand-
ards apply whether the default judgment is tested by regular appeal or writ
of error. 28 ' A writ of error may be sued out at any time within six months
after final judgment is rendered. 28 2 Rule 306a283 provides the method for
determining when the judgment was rendered. 28 4
E. Bill of Review
After a default judgment has become final and the time for regular appeal
and appeal by writ of error has elapsed, the exclusive method for a direct
attack on a judgment is by bill of review. 28 5 A bill of review is available for a
period of four years from the date of entry of the judgment, 28 6 its purpose
being to obtain a reversal of a prior judgment of the trial court under
equitable principles. 287 Notably, the bill of review is only available when it is
shown that all other relief has been exhausted or is unavailable, 288 and is
only allowed on certain narrowly prescribed grounds since it is essential to
our system of justice that judgments be accorded some finality. 28 9 Further-
275. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. arts. 2249, 2249a (Vernon 1971).
276. Flynt v. City of Kingsville, 125 Tex. 510, 82 S.W.2d 934 (1935); Roberts Corp. v.
Austin Co., 487 S.W.2d 165, 166 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1972, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
277. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2249a (Vernon 1971).
278. Id. art. 2249(2).
279. McEwen v. Harrison, 162 Tex. 125, 345 S.W.2d 706 (1961).
280. McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 928-29 (Tex. 1965); Gianelle v. Morgan, 514
S.W.2d 133, 134 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1974, no writ); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v.
Watson, 436 S.W.2d 404, 406 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
281. Roberts Corp. v. Austin Co., 487 S.W.2d 165, 166 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [14th
Dist.] 1972, no writ).
282. TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 2255 (Vernon 1971).
283. TEX. R. Civ. P. 306a.
284. Id.; Linton v. Smith, 137 Tex. 479, 483-84, 154 S.W.2d 643, 645 (1941).
285. TEX. R. Civ. P. 329b; National Bedding Co. v. McGee, 153 Tex. 55, 263 S.W.2d 948(1954); Ridley v. McCallum, 139 Tex. 540, 163 S.W.2d 833 (1942); Cocke v. Cocke, 382 S.W.2d
789, 790 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1964, no writ).
286. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5529 (Vernon 1958).
287. American Spiritualist Ass'n v. Dallas, 366 S.W.2d 97, 99 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1963,
no writ).
288. Id.; see Moore v. Mathis, 369 S.W.2d 450, 454, 455 (Tex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1963,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939 (1964).
289. Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 569, 226 S.W.2d 996, 998 (1950).
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more, the grounds required in a bill of review proceeding are not to be
relaxed by the trial court simply because their application appears to be
unjust in a particular case.2" The principle of bringing litigation to a conclu-
sion not only is essential to our system of justice but also justifies an
occasional hardship visited upon a litigant who falls outside the established
requirements of the bill of review. 29
The elements essential to the cause of action prosecuted in a bill of review
are: (1) that the plaintiff in the bill suffered a default judgment in favor of his
adversary in the prior action; (2) that the plaintiff has a meritorious defense
to the cause of action alleged against him in the former suit; (3) that the
plaintiff was not served with citation; or that he was prevented from inter-
posing his defense because of the fraud, accident, or wrongful act of his
adversary unmixed with any fault or negligence of his own; or that defend-
ant was prevented from appealing the judgment because of either: (a) the
fraud, accident, or wrongful act of the opposite party, or (b) erroneous
information given by an officer of the court acting in his official capacity in
discharge of a duty imposed by law; and that the failure to appeal was
unmixed with any fault or negligence on defendant's part; and (4) that the
plaintiff has exhausted his legal remedies of motion for new trial, appeal,
and writ of error, or did not learn of the default judgment within the time
prescribed for asserting such legal remedies.2 92
The bill of review is an equitable remedy 93 that is not a continuation of the
original action but rather is an independent action prosecuted by the losing
party. 294 It is usually instituted as an original proceeding although it may be
brought as a cross-action 295 or defense296 in a suit by the successful party
seeking to enforce the original judgment. In a bill of review proceeding a
plaintiff must allege and prove that entry of the judgment was not due to his
negligence and that he was diligent in attempting to prevent it. 297 Further,
upon learning of the judgment the plaintiff must demonstrate that he pur-
sued his legal remedies or was excused from doing so; he must use all means
at his disposal to avert or, if entered, to vacate the judgment.
290. Id.
291. Id. " 'Endless litigation, in which nothing was ever finally determined, would be worse
than occasional miscarriages of justice.' " Id.
292. Texas Indus.*, Inc. v. Sanchez, 525 S.W.2d 870, 871 (Tex. 1975); Petro-Chemical
Transp., Inc. v. Carroll, 514 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. 1974); Texas Mach. & Equip. Co. v. Gordon
Knox Oil & Exploration Co., 442 S.W.2d 315, 318 (Tex. 1969); Gracey v. West, 422 S.W.2d
913, 915-16 (Tex. 1968); Hanks v. Rosser, 378 S.W.2d 31, 34-35 (Tex. 1964); Alexander v.
Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 569, 226 S.W.2d 996, 998 (1950); Crabbe v. Hord, 536 S.W.2d 409, 412
(Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1976, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
293. 4 R. McDONALD, supra note 5, § 18.24, at 311.
294. Smith v. Higginbotham, 112 S.W.2d 770, 773 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1937, no
writ); Smith v. Kraft, 9 S.W.2d 472, 473 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1928, no writ); 4 R.
McDONALD, supra note 5, § 18.24, at 311.
295. Briggs v. Ladd, 64 S.W.2d 389, 390 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1933, no writ).
296. Dyer v. Johnson, 19 S.W.2d 421, 424 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1929, writ dism'd
w.o.j.).
297. Griffith v. Conard, 536 S.W.2d 658, 660-61 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976, no
writ); Grand United Order of Odd Fellows v. Wright, 76 S.W.2d 1073, 1074 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1934, no writ); Kimmell v. Edwards, 193 S.W. 363, 365-66 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort
Worth 1917, no writ). The action may also be barred by the four-year statute of limitations. TEX.
REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5529 (Vernon 1958); Smith v. Lightfoot, 143 S.W.2d 151, 152 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Austin 1940, no writ). This limitation period commences at the time entry of thejudgment was or should have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Id.
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The meritorious defense requirement in a bill of review is much more
onerous than the one existing under Craddock.298 In a bill of review proceed-
ing the judgment debtor must prove his defense as opposed to merely stating
the factual basis thereof. 299 Therefore, unless a plaintiff can prove all the
elements of his defense he will be denied equitable relief under the bill of
review.
A judgment may be set aside by a bill of review only as a result of
extrinsic fraud perpetrated on a defendant by a plaintiff in procuring the
judgment.3" Extrinsic fraud is committed when a party to the suit prevents
his opponent from having a fair opportunity to be heard on the merits. 10'
Such fraud may occur where defendant is misled by plaintiff's promise of a
compromise or where knowledge of the existence of the suit was kept from
the defendant by plaintiff. 30 2 Conversely, intrinsic fraud pertains to any
matter that was actually presented to the trial court and considered by it in
rendering the judgment. 30 3 Instances of intrinsic fraud include false tes-
timony, fraudulent instruments, or any such matter relating to the merits of
the claim. 31 Intrinsic fraud, however, will not suffice to set aside a default
judgment under a bill of review.
Therefore, in the ordinary bill of review case the principal controversy is
whether the allegedly fraudulent, accidental, or wrongful act of the opposing
party prevented defendant from answering; and if so whether such act
entitles defendant to have the judgment set aside. The act complained of
must be attributable to the plaintiff, his attorney, or an officer of the court
and not some other third party. 35 The act, however, need not be intentional
or arise out of an improper motive so long as it prevents defendant from
answering. 3° In fact, the conduct of plaintiff may be purely accidental; 3 7
but whatever plaintiff's conduct, the defendant must not have contributed to
the result in any way through his own fault or negligence. 30 8 Since conduct of
the plaintiff that merely allows, rather than causes, defendant to fail to
298. Ward v. Nava, 488 S.W.2d 736 (Tex. 1972).
299. Compare Anderson v. Coker, 364 S.W,2d 481, 482 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1963,
writ ref'd n.r.e.), with Ivy v. Carrell, 407 S.W.2d 212, 214 (Tex. 1966). See generally Annot.,
174 A.L.R. 10 (1948).
300. Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 568-69, 226 S.W.2d 996, 1001 (1950); Mills v.
Baird, 147 S.W.2d 312, 316-17 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1941, writ ref'd).
Extrinsic fraud, collateral to the issues in the former action and relating to the
manner in which the judgment was secured, is infinite in variety, but may be
illustrated by complaints alleging that a party or his attorney or agent, by some
unconscionable trick, device, or overreaching, secured in the prior action an
unfair advantage over the present complainant . ...
4 R. McDoNALD, supra note 5, § 18.27, at 321.
301. Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 568-69, 226 S.W.2d 996, 1001 (1950).
302. Id.
303. Id.
Illustrations of intrinsic fraud are: the assertion in the former action of a claim
or defense known to be false in fact, or outside the jurisdiction of the court; or
allegations of fraud which were or could have been set forth as a ground of
recovery or defense in the prior action.
4 R. McDoNALD, supra note 5, § 18.27.3, at 323.
304. Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 568-69, 226 S.W.2d 996, 1002 (Tex. 1950).
305. Petro-Chemical Transp., Inc. v. Carroll, 514 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. 1974); 4 R.
McDONALD, supra note 5, § 18.27.4, at 325.
306. 4 R. McDONALD, supra note 5, § 18.27.4, at 325.
307. Id. at 327.
308. Petro-Chemical Transp., Inc. v. Carroll, 514 S.W.2d 240, 243 (Tex. 1974).
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defend does not warrant setting the judgment aside, 3°9 plaintiff's failure to
inform defendant of a trial setting, absent an agreement to do so, is not a
ground for vacating the judgment.310 Similarly, plaintiff's failure to advise
defendant of the entry of a default judgment is not sufficient to warrant
setting the judgment aside even if the defendant assumed that the case was
still pending and took no timely action to have the judgment set aside. 311
A bill of review, however, is not the appropriate remedy for attacking a
judgment that is void on its face. 31 2 In such cases, the proper remedy is a
direct attack upon the judgment by motion for new trial, regular appeal, writ
of error appeal, or separate suit seeking to establish that the judgment was
void when entered.31 3 A judgment not based upon any pleadings or upon
pleadings which show on their face that no cause of action exists314 is void
and may be set aside on such an attack.315 Mere failure to sign a pleading will
not render a judgment based thereon void.3" 6
F. Collateral Attacks
A direct attack is a proceeding brought for the purpose of setting aside a
judgment3"7 and takes the form of a motion for new trial, motion to set aside,
regular appeal, writ of error appeal, or bill of review. 318 A collateral attack is
an attempt to avoid the effect of a judgment in a proceeding brought for
another purpose. Accordingly, the grounds available to support a collateral
attack are more limited. The court which entered the original judgment must
have had: (1) no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, or his
property; 319 (2) no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit;320 (3) no
jurisdiction to render the judgment entered; 32' or (4) no capacity to act as a
court. 322
In a collateral attack a fact established by a recitation in the judgment or
by the record may not be disputed by extrinsic evidence. 323 If the record is
silent as to the jurisdictional fact in dispute, such fact must be conclusively
presumed to support the judgment assuming it was entered by a court of
309. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Burton, 272 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
310. Grand United Order of Odd Fellows v. Wright, 76 S.W.2d 1073, 1074 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Waco 1934, no writ).
311. Traders & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Burton, 272 S.W.2d 166, 171 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth
1954, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
312. 4 R. McDONALD, supra note 5, § 18.24, at 311.
313. Smith v. Pegram, 80 S.W.2d 354, 355 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1935, writ ref'd).
314. Edwards Feed Mill, Inc. v. Johnson, 158 Tex. 313,315-16, 311 S.W.2d 232, 234 (1958).
315. Smith v. Pegram, 80 S.W.2d 354, 356 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1935, writ ref'd). But
where the defendant appears, lack of pleadings may not be asserted for the first time on appeal.
Bednarz v. State, 142 Tex. 138, 176 S.W.2d 562 (1943).
316. Shipp v. Anderson, 173 S.W. 598, 600 (Tex. Civ. App.-Galveston 1915, no writ).
317. McKanna v. Edgar, 388 S.W.2d 927, 928-29 (Tex. 1965).
318. See section V, subsections A, C, D, E supra.
319. Ranger Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 530 S.W.2d 162, 167 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no
writ); Carter v. G & L Tool Co., 428 S.W.2d 677, 682 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1968, no
writ).
320. Weems v. Masterson, 80 Tex. 45, 15 S.W. 590 (1891).
321. Austin Ind. School Dist. v. Sierra Club, 495 S.W.2d 878, 881 (Tex. 1973).
322. Willis v. Sabine River Authority, 363 S.W.2d 172, 175 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1962), rev'd on other grounds, 369 S.W.2d 348 (Tex. 1963).
323. Templeton v. Ferguson, 89 Tex. 47, 55, 33 S.W. 329, 333 (1895); Crawford v.
McDonald, 88 Tex. 626, 631, 33 S.W. 325, 328 (1895).
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general jurisdiction in the exercise of its ordinary judicial function. 324 An
attack may be deemed collateral although it is brought in the form of a direct
attack if the direct attack is determined to be insufficient.325
Examples of suits involving collateral attacks include the following: a
contention by defendant in an action to enforce a divorce decree that the
decree violated public policy;326 a claim by a party to a suit involving
property held by receiver that the receiver's appointment was invalid; 327 a
defense to a garnishment proceeding that attacks the original judgment on
which the writ of garnishment was issued; 328 a claim by a creditor of an
estate that an order directing surrender of certain personal property listed in
the inventory to a person claiming it was void;329 a suit for damages wherein
a defense of failure to assert a compulsory counterclaim in a former action is
raised; 330 a claim in the probate court of one county that the probate court of
a different county, which had already appointed a temporary administrator,
had no jurisdiction of the estate;33' a defense of invalidity of the judgment
asserted in a trial court action for mandamus to compel a county auditor to
approve a voucher for payment of the default judgment against the coun-
ty;332 a reply to an application for a writ of prohibition in the Texas Supreme
Court which sought to prevent the trial court from proceeding in a case in
which the supreme court had entered judgment; 333 a reply to an application
for a writ of mandamus in the Texas supreme court seeking to compel the
state comptroller to pay a judgment;334 an objection to the admission of
evidence of a judgment on the ground of its invalidity;335 an assertion by the
plaintiff that a judgment relied upon by the defendant is invalid; 336 a defense
to an action seeking to foreclose a judgment lien;337 a contention by defend-
324. Lyne v. Sanford, 82 Tex. 58, 63, 19 S.W. 847, 849 (1891); Mills v. Herndon, 60 Tex.
353, 360 (1883); Brockenborough v. Melton, 55 Tex. 493, 503 (1881).
325. Alexander v. Hagedorn, 148 Tex. 565, 226 S.W.2d 996 (1950) (equitable requirements);
Pure Oil Co. v. Reece, 124 Tex. 476, 78 S.W.2d 932 (1935) (requirement of same parties);
Gohlman, Lester & Co. v. Whittle, 115 Tex. 9, 273 S.W. 806 (1925) (requirement of same
court); Litton v. Waters, 161 S.W.2d 1095, 1096 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1942, writ ref'd
w.o.m.) (statute of limitations requirement).
326. Tinsley v. Tinsley, 512 S.W.2d 74, 76 (Tex. Civ. App.-Waco 1974, no writ).
327. Robbins v. Sandford, 29 S.W.2d 969, 970 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1930, jdgmt adopted);
King Land & Cattle Corp. v. Fikes, 414 S.W.2d 521, 524 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1967,
writ ref'd n.r.e.); Davis v. Mitchell, 225 S.W. 1117, 1118 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1920, no
writ).
328. Stockyards Nat'l Bank v. Presnall, 109 Tex. 32, 194 S.W. 384 (1917); Pumphrey v.
Hunter, 270 S.W. 237, 239-40 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1925, no writ); First Nat'l Bank v.
Alexander, 236 S.W. 229, 231 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1921, no writ); Gerlachi Mercantile
Co. v. Hughes-Bozarth-Anderson Co., 189 S.W. 784, 787-88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1916,
writ ref'd); Reeves v. Fuqua, 184 S.W. 682, 684 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1916, no writ).
329. Brown v. Fleming, 212 S.W. 483, 485, 488 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted).
330. Akers v. Simpson, 445 S.W.2d 957, 959 (Tex. 1969).
331. Stewart v. Poinboeuf, 11 Tex. 299, 233 S.W. 1095 (1921); Burdett v. Silsbee's Adm'r,
15 Tex. 604, 619-20 (1885).
332. Bynum v. Davis, 327 S.W.2d 673, 675-76 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, no writ).
333. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Fisher, 152 Tex. 29, 253 S.W.2d 656 (1952).
334. Martin v. Sheppard, 145 Tex. 639, 201 S.W.2d 810 (1947).
335. Dowdle v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 255 S.W. 388, 389 (Tex. Comm'n App.
1923, holding approved); Burns v. Barker, 71 S.W. 328, 329 (Tex. Civ. App. 1902, no writ).
336. Texas-Pacific Coal & Oil Co. v. Ames, 292 S.W. 191,192-93 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927,
jdgmt adopted); Coulson v. City of San Angelo, 286 S.W.2d 202, 203-04 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Austin 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Pearson v. Lloyd, 214 S.W. 759, 764-66 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Beaumont 1919, writ ref'd); Gibbs v. Scales, 118 S.W. 188, 189 (Tex. Civ. App. 1909, writ
ref'd).
337. Klier v. Richter, 119 S.W.2d 100, 101 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1938, writ ref'd).
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ant in an action to recover personalty on a lien note that a prior foreclosure
judgment was invalid; 338 a claim by the wife of a bankrupt that the property
sold under an order of the bankruptcy court as community property was in
fact her separate property;339 a contention by a woman seeking recovery on
an insurance policy carried by her former husband that the decree divorcing
them was defective ;340 a claim by the plaintiff in a suit to subject certain land
to payment of a judgment lien that a judgment set up by the defendant was
fraudulent; 34 1 a defense by an insurance carrier that a consent judgment
made by a claimant with its insured was unreasonable in a suit to enforce the
consent judgment; 342 a contention by the plaintiff that a previous judgment
against the defendant, which had been set aside by the court which rendered
it, was still binding on him; 343 a claim in a suit to foreclose a lien that a
judgment giving another lien on the same property was invalid; 34 an allega-
tion in an action to cancel a sheriff's deed that the judgment on which an
execution issued was defective; 345 a claim on a motion for entry of an order
nunc pro tunc that the court had no jurisdiction to make the order;346 in an
action for the recovery of taxes, a defense that the assessment was invalid in
an attack on the assessment order of the board of commissioners; 347 an
action in trespass to try title when the defendant claims title under a foreclo-
sure judgment,34 or a sale by a qualified survivor, in which the attack is on
the qualification, 349 or a sale in probate administration, 350 or a sale under levy
of execution; 351 a defense of invalidity of judgment in a suit to revive it; 352 in
an action to enjoin enforcement of a railroad commission order awarding
damages against certain carriers for unjust price discrimination, the defense
that the rates and proceedings of the railroad commission were invalid in an
attack on the order of the railroad commission setting such rates;353 a bill to
clear a cloud on title cast by prior judgment; 354 a child support action by a
338. Conner v. McAfee, 214 S.W. 646, 648 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1919, writ ref'd).
339. Foster v. Christensen, 42 S.W.2d 460, 461-62 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1931),
rev'd on other grounds, 67 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1934, holding approved).
340. Grand Lodge Colored Knights of Pythias v. Kidd, 10 S.W.2d 420, 421 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Eastland 1928, no writ).
341. Maddox v. Summerlin, 92 Tex. 483, 484-85, 49 S.W. 1033, 1034 (1899).
342. Ranger Ins. Co. v. Rogers, 530 S.W.2d 162, 167 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
343. Hull v. First Guar. State Bank, 199 S.W. 1148, 1149-51 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1917, no writ).
344. Ferrell-Michael Abstract & Title Co. v. McCormac, 184 S.W. 1081, 1087-88 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Fort Worth 1916), aff'd, 215 S.W. 559 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1919, jdgmt adopted).
345. Odle v. Frost, Barry & Lee, 59 Tex. 684, 686-88 (1883).
346. Hannon v. Henson, 15 S.W.2d 579, 584-85 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929, jdgmt adopted).
347. Dallas County Bois D'Arc Island Levee Dist. v. Glenn, 288 S.W. 165, 166-67 (Tex.
Comm'n App. 1926, jdgmt adopted).
348. Campbell v. Elliott, 52 Tex. 151, 154-60 (1879); Ernell v. O'Fiel, 441 S.W.2d 653, 654-55
(Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1969, writ ref'd n.r.e.); M.T. Jones Lumber Co. v. Rhoades, 41
S.W. 102, 103-07 (Tex. Civ. App. 1897, writ ref'd); see McCreery v. Fortson, 35 Tex. 642,
648-51 (1872).
349. Rice v. Lipsitz, 211 S.W. 293, 295-96 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1919, no writ).
350. Crawford v. McDonald, 88 Tex. 626, 628-29, 33 S.W. 325, 327 (1895).
351. Collins v. Miller, 64 Tex. 118, 119-20 (1885).
352. City of Sherman v. Langham, 92 Tex. 13, 18, 42 S.W. 961, 962-63 (1897), on rehearing
rev'g on other grounds 92 Tex. 13, 40 S.W. 140 (1897); Gallagher v. Teuscher & Co., 186 S.W.
409, 410 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1916, no writ).
353. Producers' Ref. Co. v. Missouri, K. & T.R.R., 13 S.W.2d 679, 679-80 (Tex. Comm'n
App. 1929, jdgmt adopted), aff'g 3 S.W.2d 489 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1928).
354. Watson v. Rochmill, 137 Tex. 565, 567, 155 S.W.2d 783, 784-85 (1941).
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former wife wherein a recitation of "no children" in the divorce decree was
asserted as a defense;355 an action for abstract of judgment; 356 a suit to annul
a marriage when there was a prior divorce;357 a suit for trial of the right to
property seized under sequestration;3 58 an action for malicious prosecution
when the judgment was one of conviction; 359 an action for damages for
wrongful levy of execution ;36 an action for conversion of oil sold in receiv-
ership;36' and a habeas corpus proceeding by a husband attacking a child
support judgment for which he was jailed for contempt. 362
In comparing a direct attack to a collateral attack, the direct attack has
certain advantages. In a direct attack the moving party may assert any kind
of error that caused an erroneous judgment. The scope of evidence permis-
sible in a direct attack is broader than in a collateral attack since evidence
outside the record and any other kind of evidence otherwise admissible is
permitted in a direct attack either to prove or disprove the facts reflected in
the record.3 63 But in a collateral attack only the record may be considered,
and recitals in the judgment may not be contradicted by other parts of the
record. 364 Furthermore, a jurisdictional error must be more serious in a
collateral attack than in a direct attack. 365
Despite these disadvantages, the collateral attack does have some advan-
tages. For example, the statute of limitations does not apply since a collater-
al attack is not a cause of action. 36 Further, a meritorious defense is not
required, 367 and innocent purchasers for value may not intervene because
the face of the record discloses the invalidity of the judgment. 36
VI. CONCLUSION
Default judgments are essential to our judicial system because they pro-
vide the mechanism for disposing of unopposed claims. The standards for
attacking judgments by default are intelligible and strike a reasonable bal-
ance between the need for finality of judgments and the right of the litigant
to be heard on the merits. Craddock, Hagedorn, and their progeny articulate
workable rules to guide the trial court in determining the propriety of setting
aside default judgments. The utility of Craddock and Hagedorn rests in
great measure on the broad discretionary powers of the trial judge. In order
355. Charvis v. Charvis, 529 S.W.2d 814, 815 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1975, no writ).
356. Estey & Camp v. Williams, 133 S.W. 470, 471-73 (Tex. Civ. App. 1910, writ ref'd).
357. Lawrence v. Bradley, 295 S.W.2d 746, 748 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1956, no writ).
358. Harris v. Wise, 191 S.W. 588, 589-90 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1917, no writ).
359. Kruegel v. Stewart, 81 S.W. 365, 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1904, writ ref'd).
360. Endel v. Norris, 93 Tex. 540, 57 S.W. 25 (1900).
361. Davenport v. East Tex. Ref. Co., 127 S.W.2d 312, 313-16 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana
1939, writ ref'd).
362. Ex parte Limoges, 526 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1975, no writ).
363. An exception to this statement is a direct attack by writ of error appeal. See section V,
subsection D supra.
364. Crawford v. McDonald, 88 Tex. 626, 632, 33 S.W. 325, 328 (1895); Texas-Pacific Coal
& Oil Co. v. Ames, 292 S.W. 191, 192-93 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1927, jdgmt adopted); Griggs v.
Montgomery, 22 S.W.2d 688, 692 (Tex. Civ. App.-Beaumont 1929, no writ).
365. Crawford v. McDonald, 88 Tex. 626, 630, 33 S.W. 325, 327-28 (1895).
366. TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 5529 (Vernon 1958).
367. Galveston, H. & S.A. Ry. v. Ware, 74 Tex. 47, 48-49, 11 S.W. 918, 919 (1889); City of
Corpus Christi v. Scruggs, 89 S.W.2d 458, 460 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1935, no writ).
368. See Johnston v. Stinson, 215 S.W.2d 218, 223 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1948, writ
ref'd n.r.e.).
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for these rules to work fairly, they must be applied evenhandedly. Relaxa-
tion of these rules would only erode the principle of finality of judgments
and would emasculate an important section of our rules of civil procedure.
Conversely, too strict an application of these rules would impede the ends of
substantial justice and surely result in meritorious claims or defenses not
being heard.
Certainly, judgments by default should be utilized in a manner that will
not sacrifice individual claims under a guise of judicial efficiency. Courts,
however, sometimes ignore the criteria of Craddock and Hagedorn in an
effort to achieve equity. This approach is unwarranted since application of
the Craddock and Hagedorn criteria are designed to obtain an equitable
result. The tests of Craddock and Hagedorn apply workable objective
criteria that encompass the competing interests of all the parties. The exer-
cise of the trial court's broad discretionary powers should be guided, con-
trolled, and reviewed by these established legal principles. The discretion
reposed in the trial court is not a mental discretion to be executed ex gratia,
but a legal discretion to be exercised in conformity with the letter and the
spirit of the law.

